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WILLIAM S. LEWIS 
Althusser’s Scientism and Aleatory Materialism 
 
 
Introduction 
 Following the posthumous publication of the last philosophical 
writings of Louis Althusser on the subject of “aleatory materialism” or, as 
the philosophy developed in these writings is also known, “the materialism 
of the encounter,” there has been a steady increase in the number of 
thinkers engaging with these texts. Most have done so either to explain 
them, to critique them, to apply them, or to compare them with other 
theories of revolutionary politics. Scholarly engagement with these writings 
attained perhaps its highest point with the publication of the collective 
volumes Autour d’Althusser, Penser un matérialisme aléatoire in 2012 and 
Encountering Althusser: Politics and Materialism in Contemporary Thought in 2013. 
 Almost twenty years after their first appearance in French and eight 
years after their translation into English, there is now a large body of 
secondary literature on the subject of aleatory materialism and we can begin 
to categorize these responses. If we leave to one side the critiques of the 
later Althusser which begin from a clearly anti-Marxist perspective as well as 
those that search in Althusser’s philosophy for a key to his biography (and 
in his biography a key to his philosophy) one can divide the responses 
which take Althusser’s philosophy seriously into two categories. In the first 
are those readings which maintain that Althusser achieved something of 
importance with his classic works from the early 1960s and which also hold 
that there may be something of interest in Althusser’s subsequent revision 
of these ideas and arguments. However, these readings also assert that–at a 
certain point–Althusser’s thoughts become inconsistent, contradictory, and 
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of little philosophical or political value.1  The present essay will challenge 
this position only indirectly, by suggesting that the difference between the 
Althusser of 1965 and that of 1985 is more a question of rhetorical style and 
of philosophical rigor than a question of philosophical content, depth, 
consistency, or applicability. In the second category can be placed those 
readings that take seriously Althusser’s philosophical work from the late 
1970s and 1980s, who try to explain it, to apply its insights to political 
questions, and who use ideas from these works to engage with other 
political philosophies. Within the responses of this type, there is another 
large division. On the one hand, there is a group of readings which maintain 
that the importance of the philosophy of the encounter is due somewhat to 
the fact that, with this philosophy, Althusser rejected the scientistic aspect 
of his political philosophy and, instead, replaced it with a new ontology–a 
materialism of the encounter–that could explain and justify a renewed 
political practice.2 On the other hand, there are responses which take 
seriously Althusser’s philosophical work from the 1980s but which also 
maintain that there is a clear continuity between the Althusser of the 1970s–
who strongly argued that it is only by the methods of the sciences and 
particularly by the methods of historical materialism that the political 
conjuncture could be understood and a correct political line identified–and 
the Althusser of the 1980s who seemed to hardly speak of these relations or 
of this need. 
 The reading of Althusser that emphasizes the continuity of his 
thought between 1960 (or even earlier) and 1987 is fast becoming the 
                                                 
1 Balibar, “Tais-toi, Althusser! (1988)”; Cangiani, “Althusser and the Critique of 
Political Economy,” 245; Elliott, Althusser, 255–300; Elliott, “Postscript,” 74–75; 
Garo, “<<Il Pleut>> – Matérialisme de la rencontre et politique du vide chez le 
dernier Althusser.” 
2 Badiou, “Can Change Be Thought? (interview),” 304. 
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accepted one.3 However, within this consensus, the majority opinion is that, 
in his last works, Althusser denies, rejects, or simply abandons the theory of 
the relation he had previously specified as necessary between good scientific 
knowledge and effective political action (where “effective” is defined as a 
political action that secures and maintains a desired good). This denial of the 
scientistic aspect of his project has had significant effects. The first 
consequence is that it has served to obscure the importance of Althusser’s 
arguments and theoretical innovations from the first half of the 1960s as 
well as the significant revisions and developments these arguments and 
concepts underwent between 1966 and 1978. The second consequence of 
this reading is that it has helped establish an apparently clear connection 
between Althusser and certain contemporary philosophers who look to 
ontology in order to find a political direction and who tend to reject or 
minimize the role played by the sciences in such a process.4 A third 
consequence is that it has encouraged or even justified the contemporary 
retreat of Marxism into political theory (where it mostly competes in 
theoretical space with other political theories) instead of into a scientific and 
practical engagement with the socio-economic-political world and its 
possibilities.  
 This essay will not challenge the forging of a connection between 
Althusser and contemporary philosophers who look to ontology in order to 
discover a revolutionary possibility, nor will it analyze specific instances of 
this retreat into intramural theory. However, by demonstrating the 
                                                 
3 Boer, “Althusser’s Catholic Marxism”; Goshgarian, “The Very Essence of the 
Object, the Soul of Marxism and Other Singular Things”; Henninger, “Facticity and 
Contingency in Louis Althusser’s Aleatory Materialism,” 37. 
4  Those who follow this tendency wholly or partially include: Bryant, Srnicek, and 
Harman, The Speculative Turn; Badiou, “Can Change Be Thought? (interview)”; 
Diefenbach, “Althusser with Deleuze,” 179–180; Illas, “The Procrustean Bed of Class 
Struggle,” 3; Johnston, “A Critique of Natural Economy: Quantum Physics with 
Zizek”; Negri, “Notes on the Evolution of the Thought of Louis Althusser”; Toscano, 
“Aleatory Rationalism”; Vatter, “Althusser et Machiavel.” 
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correctness of the reading of Althusser which finds in his conception of the 
relations between science, philosophy, and politics a continuity, it will 
challenge those critics: (a) who wish to differentiate between an earlier, 
scientistic Althusser and a later, ontological one; (b) who want to forge a 
connection between Althusser and contemporary philosophers who look to 
ontology in order to suggest a political direction; and (c) who overestimate 
the role played by philosophy in understanding and encouraging 
revolutionary transitions. 
 In order to show that the reading of Althusser which finds a 
pronounced continuity in his conception of the relations among science, 
philosophy, and politics is the correct one, this essay will begin with an 
examination of Althusser’s “scientism.” The meaning of this term (one that 
differs slightly from contemporary usages) will be specified before showing 
how and in what way Althusser’s political philosophy between 1960 and 
1980 can be described as “scientistic.” The next section will detail the 
important political role Althusser assigned to the sciences and particularly to 
the science of historical materialism during this period. This accomplished, 
the arguments of interpreters who emphasize the apparent difference in 
Althusser’s attitude towards science before and after 1980 will be 
considered. Here, possible reasons for such a reading will be rehearsed . 
Next, with the support of recently published and archival documents, this 
essay will engage in a close and comparative reading of Althusser’s texts 
from the 1970s and 1980s that have as their subject the relations among 
philosophy, science, and politics. This survey will show the continuity in 
Althusser’s position vis-à-vis the sciences: namely, that if we want good (i.e. 
desired) socio-politico-economic changes to result from our political 
actions, then it is necessary to engage in social scientific research or, at  the 
very least, to consult such research and to use this knowledge in our political 
decision making. All this serves to support the conclusion that Althusser’s 
4
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“new” political philosophy from the 1980s is not really so new. On the 
contrary, his writings on the materialism of the encounter and aleatory 
materialism represent prolongations and elaborations of positions and ideas 
already developed in the 1960s and 1970s and that include a mostly 
consistent understanding of the relations between scientific knowledge and 
political action. This is true even if the rhetorical and philosophical style in 
which these ideas are put forth in the 1980s differs from the ways in which 
these ideas were introduced during the prior two decades. 
 
 
1. Definition of Althusser’s Scientism 
 It is well known and often remarked upon by his critics that 
Althusser’s work from the early 1960s until the end of the 1970s is 
“scientistic” or that he was guilty of something called “scientism .”5 Almost 
always, these remarks are pejorative.6 Those who levy this charge do so to 
mark out Althusser as someone who reductively and wrongly appeals to the 
methods of the natural or social sciences (or the knowledge produced by 
these sciences) in order to understand an aspect of existence that the critic 
believes might better be understood by other means.7 Sometimes, though, 
the charge of scientism is meant to convey a slightly older but still utilized 
sense of the term: namely, that Althusser holds the epistemological position 
that all questions of knowledge and action are best answered by the 
methods of the natural sciences and that the natural sciences on their own 
can explain any and all phenomena.8 
                                                 
5 Dosse, History of Structuralism. Vol. 1, 88–91; George, “Reading Althusser”; 
Rancière, “Sur La Théorie de L’idéologie Politique d’Althusser,” 39; Wolin, The 
Wind from the East, 120–121. 
6 An exception is Amariglio, “Marxism against Economic Science,” 163. 
7 Schöttler, “Scientisme sur l’histoire d’un concept difficile.” 
8  Haack, “Six Signs of Scientism,” 77. 
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 Although Althusser certainly endorsed scientific practice during this 
period as the best and most reliable way to produce knowledge about the 
way our socio-economic relations are structured and intentionally 
transformed, he did not believe that all questions of knowledge and action 
are best answered by the methods of the natural sciences.  9 For instance, he 
also argued that artistic and philosophical practice can produce critical 
awareness of the world and that these practices may even occasion political 
transformation.10 He also did not think that the natural sciences can explain 
or give the truth of any phenomenon or that the social world and its history 
can be explained wholly by appeal to the laws of the natural world.11 He 
believed even less that the social sciences could give us the truth of 
ourselves, of our individual and collective natures, or of our future social 
and economic arrangements.12 Therefore, his work does not exactly fit the 
definition of scientism, at least according to the two most common 
meanings of the term. 
 Despite the fact that Althusser’s work exactly fits neither of the 
typical definitions of scientism, his philosophy was scientistic in this precise 
respect: Althusser consistently argued that science is the only human 
theoretical practice that allows us to reliably understand socio-politico-
economic structures such that we might intentionally assist in their 
transformation. Science, and more specifically the Marxist science of history, 
historical materialism, can do so, he argued, because it allows us to 
understand the origin of our ideological notions about what is good for 
society and about what is to be done politically. It also allows us to critique 
                                                 
9 Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other 
Essays, 105–109. 
10 Althusser, “Cremonini, peintre de l’abstrait (1964-66)”; Althusser, “Sur Brecht et 
Marx (1968)”; Bargu, “In the Theater of Politics”; Wilson, The Visual World of 
French Theory. 
11 Robert Paul Resch, Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory (Berkeley 
(Calif.): University of California Press, 1992), 195–201. 
12 Althusser, “On Levi-Strauss.” 
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these notions and to replace them with scientific understandings (principles) 
of why we think and act the way we do. In turn, this knowledge allows us to 
develop new plans for political actions, ones based on a critical and 
scientific understanding of the actual processes at work in a particular 
historical conjuncture and of its possible transformation.13 Unlike 
ideological practice, which tends to the reproduction of existing socio-
economic relations, one of the most important things about historical 
materialism for Althusser is that, once inaugurated, its practice tends to 
replace existing ideas about our social and natural relations and to generate 
new and politically reliable knowledge about the world. This new awareness 
and this new knowledge of social relations is practical knowledge or 
knowledge for practice. Insofar as it is correct, it allows us to change 
ourselves and to change our world. 
 
 
2. Althusser’s (mostly) consistent scientism: 1960-1980 
 Although it is part of the argument of this paper that Althusser’s 
scientism was consistent between 1960 and 1980, this contention has not yet 
                                                 
13 Louis Althusser, “Théorie Marxiste et Parti Communiste>> (<<Union 
théorie/pratique). 1966-1967,” 1967 1966, 12, Fonds Althusser, Institut Mémoires de 
l’Édition Contemporaine. All translations are by the author of this paper. All 
emphases (signified by italics) are Althusser’s. 
 Cette révolution théorique a permis ce qui était interdit aux anciennes 
philosophies de l’histoire : la connaissance du type d’unité complexe existant 
entre une société et ses idéologies. La science de l’histoire marxiste est en 
effet une théorie qui rend compte de la structure d’une société, et donc en 
même temps des “niveaux” ou “instances” distincts qui constituent cette 
structure au niveau économique, mais aussi du niveau politique eu du niveau 
idéologique. C’est l’existence de cette théorie qui permet à la connaissance 
marxiste de courir à la fois la connaissance des fondements de la société 
existante, ce que le socialisme utopique, suspendu en aveugle aux principes 
idéologiques existants, est évidemment incapable de produire.  
 La théorie marxiste met ainsi en oeuvre ses principes scientifiques 
dans 1/ la connaissance critique de la société existante  2/ la définition des fins 
du socialisme  3/ la détermination des moyens d’action propres à faire la 
révolution.  
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been supported. It is important to provide an account of this position’s 
consistency for three reasons. First, because this position is often neither 
well explained nor well understood. Second, because it is unlikely that 
someone who held such a position for two decades would suddenly 
renounce it, the demonstration of this position’s longevity raises the burden 
of proof for those who would argue that Althusser dropped the scientistic 
aspects of his political philosophy in subsequent work. Third, detailing the 
consistency of Althusser’s position over this time allows one to see the 
evolution in his thought regarding the relations among philosophy, science, 
and politics and, thereby, to better understand any changes to his view of 
philosophy that may have precipitated a change in Althusser’s attitude 
regarding the role of science in his political philosophy. 
 In an interview with the Mexican philosopher Fernanda Navarro that 
took place near the end of his career, Althusser provided a brief 
periodization of his thought. He distinguished these periods by the 
definition of Marxist philosophy that characterized each one. During the 
time that his most well-known or “classic” works were published (1960-65), 
Althusser defined philosophy as “the theory of theoretical practice.” Only a 
year or so after the appearance of For Marx and Reading Capital in 1965, he 
revised his opinion and began arguing that “[Marxist] philosophy represents 
politics with the sciences and scientificity with the practices.”14 Then, about 
five years after this understanding of philosophy was promulgated (1972), 
Althusser replaced it with the pithier definition: “philosophy is class struggle 
in theory.” 
 In the interview with Navarro, Althusser insisted that the 
characterization of philosophy as “class struggle in theory” was definitive.15 
However, this neat periodization and the claim that this definition of 
                                                 
14  Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 240, 249fn27. 
15 Ibid., 240. 
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philosophy was final is complicated by the fact that Althusser introduced at 
least five other definitions of Marxist philosophy during the course of his 
career, three of which were coined between 1976 and 1986. These include 
the definition of Marx’s philosophy as “void,” as “non-philosophy,16” as the 
“Marxist position in philosophy”17 as “hyper-materialism,” as a “materialism 
of the encounter” and as “aleatory materialism.” Given these shifts, we 
might wonder whether the successive changes or variations to his definition 
of philosophy also meant changes to his understanding of science. If they 
did, then there is perhaps an argument to be made for the evolution of 
Althusser’s scientism. If not, then we can argue that Althusser’s view of 
science, of science’s relation to philosophy, and the role of scientific 
knowledge in politics remains more or less consistent after 1965. 
 
2.1 Althusser’s scientism 1960-1965 
 The most well-known of Althusser’s positions on Marx’s 
development, on Marxian philosophy, and on Marxist science were 
promulgated between 1960 and 1965, first in a series of articles and then in 
the books For Marx and Reading Capital. In addition to being original and 
heterodox, these positions had the virtues of being clean, simple, and 
formal. In these works, Althusser maintained that, sometime between 1845 
and 1847, Marx broke with the idealist notions that characterized his early 
work and that he then inaugurated a philosophy (dialectical materialism) that 
allowed for the advancement of a critical materialist science of history 
(historical materialism).18 Though Althusser also tried to show that Marx 
could not and did not always render explicit concepts such as mode of 
production, productive forces, relations of production, superstructure, 
                                                 
16 Althusser, “La transformation de la philosophie – Conférence de Grenade (1976),” 
177. 
17 Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes, 375. 
18 Althusser, “On the Young Marx: Theoretical Quetions (1961)”; Resch, Althusser 
and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory, 169–170. 
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contradiction, overdetermination, ideology, etc., that allowed this science to 
proceed, he argued that these and other concepts could be made so by a 
symptomatic reading of Marx’s mature writings.19 
 Along with this revisionist reading of Marx and the analytic work on 
Marxist concepts, Althusser also undertook the complementary 
epistemological task of explaining how Marxist science went about 
producing true knowledge of the socioeconomic world and of how this 
knowledge differs from the ideological understanding we have of it 
spontaneously. According to Althusser, Marxist Science or “historical 
materialism” differs from other social sciences. It does so both in terms of 
its object, the history of class struggle, and in terms of its method, which is 
synthetic and critical. Historical materialism is synthetic insofar as it employs 
the results of the social and natural sciences in its own demonstrations. It  is 
critical insofar as it also sees fit to direct scientific research and to evaluate 
any specific science’s results or methodology. However, historical 
materialism does not differ in terms of being a science. As a science, it 
makes use of a body of concepts and abstractive practices including 
experimentation, observation, and quantification to develop new knowledge 
about the real. This knowledge is verified by the criteria it has established in 
the formation of its proper concepts.20 Historical materialism also 
recognizes the knowledge that it produces as provisional, that is, as 
amenable or as able to be overturned through further scientific practice.21 
 The knowledge that scientific practice produces is seen in its 
openness and novelty to differ fundamentally from that other theoretical 
practice which Althusser habitually contrasts it with and from which it 
emerges: namely, ideological practice. Defined as that set of beliefs 
                                                 
19 Althusser, “From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy”; Solomon, “L’espacement de La 
Lecture.” 
20 Elliott, Althusser, 82. 
21 Ibid., 84. 
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necessarily held by groups of individuals whose effect is to guarantee the 
reproduction of certain socioeconomic relations,22 ideology always relates 
directly to the political and economic exigencies of the events that give birth 
to it and to which it is subjected. As Althusser notes, ideology is “content to 
reflect the historical changes which it is its mission to assimilate and 
master.”23 Therefore, unlike science, which is potentially productive of new 
knowledge and remains open to revision, ideology “is theoretically closed.” 24 
 But how does one tell the difference between scientific knowledge 
and ideological knowledge? During this period, Althusser solved the 
problem of demarcation by bringing in Marxist philosophy as arbiter. 
Marxist philosophy, he maintained, is itself a science, but one that has as its 
object the rational critique of the scientific ideas established in the course of 
historical materialist research. Philosophy, he maintained, is the “Theory of 
theoretical practices” and its job is to rationally differentiate between 
ideological notions and scientific concepts. By seeing if a theory accords 
with Marxist philosophical concepts, philosophy can rule on what 
constitutes a genuine addition to knowledge.25 Without such an analysis, 
Althusser argued, it is impossible to differentiate between scientific and 
ideological knowledge. Further, and because correct action follows from 
                                                 
22 Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays, 132–33., 
23 Althusser and Balibar, Reading “Capital,” 141–42. 
24 Ibid. 
25 To rehearse a simple example employed by Althusser, if some set of thinkers was 
to claim that the historical essence of human beings is to be engaged in creative acts 
that tend toward the overcoming of our own alienation, then a philosopher could use 
her stock of Marxist concepts to analyze and critique this claim. Is it scientifically 
warranted, this philosopher might ask, to believe that humans are fated to achieve the 
self-overcoming of their own alienation through creative acts? Which of Marx’s 
scientific concepts are used in order to make such a claim? What historical materialist 
research supports such a claim? If no concepts are used and no support is given and 
yet such a belief persists and is promulgated, then the historical materialist has reason 
to suspect that the idea may be ideological and that it somehow reinforces existing 
socioeconomic relations. Althusser, “Letter to the Central Committee of the PCF, 18 
March 1966.” 
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correct knowledge, without historical materialist research, it is impossible to 
ensure correct political action.26 
 Clearly, Althusser’s thinking about the relationship between scientific 
knowledge and successful political action between 1960 and 1966 was 
scientistic according to the definition of the term given above: historical 
materialism is said to be the only human theoretical practice which allow us 
to reliably understand existing socio-economic structures in their history, 
their existence, and in their possible transformation. However, it is also true 
that Althusser maintained during this period that Marxist science (historical 
materialism) had need of Marxist Philosophy (dialectical materialism) in 
order to certify its research and to monitor its progress.27 Science, though 
crucial for political progress, was not represented as an autonomous practice 
that independently produces reliable results. Marxist philosophy was needed 
to modify its body of knowledge and its methods by separating out from the 
science any ideological contents. In this respect, philosophical practice 
guaranteed historical materialism’s own scientificity.28 
 
2.2 Althusser’s scientism 1966-1972 
 Despite fighting strongly for this position and for the political 
recommendation which followed from it that the direction of the 
Communist Party be given over to philosophers or at least that 
philosophers’ voices be given more weight in party decision making, in 1966 
Althusser began modifying his ideas about the definition of Marxist 
philosophy and about its relation to Marxist Science. He also weakened his 
claim about a clear break in Marx’s work.29 From this time on, he referred to 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Althusser, “Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation: Ideology and 
Ideological Struggle.,” 5–13, 34–42. 
28 Ibid., 38–40. 
29 Lewis, “‘Editorial Introduction to Louis Althusser’s “Letter to the Central 
Committee of the PCF, 18 March, 1966”.’” 
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this epistemological stance as “theoreticist” and admitted his mistake in 
thinking that philosophical practice allowed one to clearly differentiate 
scientific from ideological knowledge.30 While he did not give up on finding 
a method to differentiate between the two types of knowledges, he also no 
longer maintained that this could be done using solely rationalist criteria. 
 Though the transition was by no means sudden or entirely clean, by 
1967 and certainly by the time he was preparing his lecture notes for the 
seminars that would eventually be published as Philosophy and the Spontaneous 
Philosophy of the Scientists, Althusser had revised his definition of philosophy.31 
Philosophy was no longer understood as the “the theory of theoretical 
practices.” Instead, he now ventured the thesis that “philosophy represents 
politics in the domain of theory, or to be more precise: with the sciences – and, 
vice versa, philosophy represents scientificity in politics.”32 
 In the early 1960s, philosophy was understood by Althusser to exist 
outside of both ideology and science; it was an independent theoretical 
practice that had its own rules and its own object. Now though, it was 
thought to exist only as a void, as a partisan and critical moment within the 
existing theoretical practices of ideology and science.33 Within a specific 
science’s body of theory, Althusser explained, philosophy acts in a partisan 
manner when it works against that science’s tendency to embrace idealistic 
explanations of its object.34 It also acts critically when it calls a specific 
science’s attention to its own ideological contents. The contents that it 
critiques may be ideological prejudices from the wider society that constitute 
part of the conceptual assumptions of the science or they may be biases that 
color its results and their reception. Alternately, these ideological contents 
may consist in the importation of concepts proper to other sciences within a 
                                                 
30 Althusser, “Lenin and Philosphy (February 1968),” 182–186. 
31 Goshgarian, “Introduction,” xiii–xvi. 
32 Macherey, “Althusser et Le Concept de Philosophie Spontanée Des Savants.” 
33 Althusser, “Lenin and Philosphy (February 1968),” 65. 
34 Matheron, “The Recurrence of the Void in Louis Althusser,” 28. 
13
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particular science’s explanatory schema.35 Within politics, Althusser 
maintains, philosophy acts by demanding that our accepted ideas about the 
world, about how it works, and about who inhabits it be subjected to 
scientific scrutiny or that they be informed by scientific results. Because 
scientific practice always and in the long run tends to the side of 
materialism, this act is also a partisan intervention against ideal explanation 
(and therefore against ideological support) of the socio-economic world and 
its contents.36 
 As the last paragraph suggests, Althusser did not argue after 1966 that 
the knowledge science produced was free from ideology or that philosophy 
could emancipate it and us from all ideological thinking. In fact, one of the 
main and lasting changes Althusser’s epistemology underwent between mid-
1966 and 1968 was his embrace of Foucault’s insight that thought always 
functions in relation to politics or, better put, that all theory is political.37 A 
correlate to this insight was Althusser’s claim that  science and ideology are 
always admixed, that there is no definitive method for their separation, and 
that ideological concepts always frame the production and reception of 
scientific results.38 Despite this correlation, Althusser remained consistent in 
his belief that scientific practice tends to produce a more reliable 
understanding of the world (at least if we wish to change it) than does the 
preexisting conception of our world that we find ready-to-hand (and mind) 
in ideology. More specifically, Althusser persisted in his argument that all 
societies are class societies riven by class conflict, and that, on the basis of 
this discovery, Marx founded a science called historical materialism.39 
                                                 
35 Althusser, “Lenin and Philosphy (February 1968),” 64. 
36 Althusser, Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savants, 1967, 96–98. 
37 Garo, “The Impossible Break,” 282. 
38 Althusser, Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savants, 1967, 132–134. 
39 Ibid., 256. 
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Further, he argued that it was only by the adoption of this science that the 
worker’s movement could potentially find success.40 
 Not only was Althusser steady in this position, he developed it 
further in works like Lenin and Philosophy (1968) and in the 1968 interview 
“Philosophy as a Revolutionary Weapon.” In texts from this phase in his 
career, Althusser argued that historical materialism produces a reliable form 
of socio-economic knowledge, one that can be used in the intentional 
transformation of human social and economic relationships. As a critical 
and overarching social scientific discipline, it makes use of the results from 
specific sciences while also engaging in their critique and in their synthesis.41 
Historical materialism’s critical powers are derived from its understanding of 
historical necessities, of why we must think and act the way we do, and of 
the ways we might potentially think and act. They are not derived from any 
extra-scientific critical method, morality, or philosophical anthropology, 
although this is always a danger that must be guarded against .42 Historical 
materialism allows us to understand our history, our present, and our future 
possibilities scientifically (that is, by way of abstractions from experience 
and then by demonstrations).43 With this knowledge, philosophy can then 
argue in politics. It can demonstrate what ideas about the social world are 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 130. 
41 Althusser, “The Historical Task of Marxist Philosophy (1967),” 161. 
42 As Althusser writes in the draft of a Communist Party manual in 1966 or early 
1967 :  
La critique de la société existante passe donc, dans le marxisme, par la critique 
de ses principes idéologiques. Mais alors la critique prend un nouveau sens : il 
ne s’agit plus de juger de la bonté ou de la malfaisance de telle société, au 
nom de “valeurs” (morales ou juridiques) donc d’approuver et de condamner,- 
il s’agit d’abord de connaître, donc de comprendre la nécessité à la fois de la 
société existante et de ses principes idéologiques et de leur disparition. La 
critique n’est pas première, elle est seconde à la connaissance de la nécessité 
historique, elle ne lui est pas antérieure mais intérieure.  
Althusser, “ALT2. A7-01.09 <<Théorie Marxiste et Parti Communiste>> 
(<<Union théorie/pratique>>). (1966-1967).” 
43 Ibid.; Goshgarian, “The Very Essence of the Object, the Soul of Marxism and 
Other Singular Things,” 105. 
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ideological (including philosophical ones), explain why they exist, and it can 
suggest the correct actions to be taken if we want to change not only these 
ideas but also the social forces that produce and sustain them. The result of 
this intervention of philosophy into politics is better political practice; that 
is, a political practice more likely to generate the results desired.44 
 
2.3 Althusser’s scientism 1972-1980 
 While most associate the definition of philosophy as “class struggle in 
the field of theory” with Althusser’s short work from 1972 titled “A Reply 
to John Lewis,” the approximate phrase appears already in the 1968 
interview cited above. It is also strongly implied in the 1967 work Philosophy 
and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists .45 However, it is in the polemic 
against John Lewis that Althusser introduces its definitive formulation: 
“philosophy is, in the last instance, class struggle in the field of theory.”  46 
This new formulation marks more a simplification of the phrase 
“philosophy represents politics in the domain of theory, or to be more 
precise: with the sciences – and, vice versa, philosophy represents scientificity in 
politics” than it does any significant change to its meaning. This is the case 
because, as Althusser explains in the “Reply,” philosophy is only able to 
affect these practices within theory itself. Philosophy does not march in the 
streets, call for a general strike, or bribe an official. However, it can be 
employed within politics to suggest that, based on a historical materialist 
analysis of the historical conjuncture, it may be a propitious time to do any 
one of the above.47 Philosophy also does not experiment, observe 
phenomena, or reason deductively about natural or social processes. 
                                                 
44 Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, 7; Althusser, Philosophy and the 
Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other Essays, 103. 
45 Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other 
Essays, 116–17; Baltas, “Critical Notice,” 655. 
46 Althusser, “Reply to John Lewis,” 37. 
47 Ibid., 58; Althusser, “The Historical Task of Marxist Philosophy (1967),” 166. 
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However, within science and from the point of view of class politics, it can 
move around in existing theory. Once there, it can critique the results of a 
science or suggest that there are problems with a science’s presuppositions  
or with its reasoning. These criticisms may change the way a science is 
practiced and how it understands its object or it might even inaugurate a 
new way of thinking about social processes and structures.48 
 Althusser’s streamlining of his definition of philosophy in 1972 did 
little to change his understanding of the role of science in effective political 
decision making. In fact, the first half of the 1970s saw Althusser refining 
this position as part and parcel of his enduring war on two fronts against 
Stalinism and Humanism within the communist party. The second half of 
the decade though saw him developing his theory of how science 
contributes to political change and how it influences philosophy in some 
detail. This development was occasioned by discussion within the PCF of 
whether or not it should drop from its platform the position that a 
dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary to effect a transition from 
capitalism to communism. Spurred on by these discussions and indignant 
that a sound historical materialist concept developed over the course of the 
worker’s movement might be dropped, Althusser elaborated his points 
about how scientific knowledge must be harnessed so as to optimally inform 
communist political action. 
 The specifics of Althusser’s plan to direct social scientific research 
and to employ it in party political decision making are  covered in myessay 
“Concrete Analysis and Pragmatic Social Theory (Notes Towards an 
Althusserian Critical Theory)” and the political context is made clear in 
Goshgarian’s 2006 introduction to Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings 
                                                 
48 Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, 117–118; Althusser, “Projet de livre sur 
l’impérialisme. 1973,” 5–6, 9. 
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1978-87. 49 Rather than rehearse these details, it may be more useful in this 
section to look at some texts from this period that evidence these 
elaborations but that also show Althusser’s developing thoughts on the 
relationship between philosophy and science. 
 A few writings from this period that show the development in 
Althusser’s ideas about how Marxist science can aid the worker’s movement 
and which also show the relationship between philosophy, politics, and 
science are grouped together in Althusser’s archives under the rubric 
“Textes divers sur la philosophie.” Their argument is difficult to follow if 
one does not keep in mind that–by this point in his career–Althusser had 
largely stopped repeating the communist dogma that Marxist philosophy is 
identical with dialectical materialism. After trying for years to reconstruct 
dialectical materialism as a “non-speculative, non-positivist” position in the 
public (and communist party) mind and failing, Althusser had by this point 
almost given up.50 Instead, he began to label the philosophy inaugurated by 
Marx as, alternately: “the philosophy of Marx,” “a Marxist position in 
philosophy” or, to better contrast it with the idealist philosophy of which 
dogmatic dialectical materialism had for him become a representative, “anti-
philosophy” or “non-philosophy.”51 
 If we register this change in nomenclature, we can better follow 
Althusser’s critique of the position that “a science [and in particular the 
science of historical materialism] is an integral part of a philosophy 
                                                 
49 Goshgarian, “Translator’s Introduction”; Lewis, “Concrete Analysis and Pragmatic 
Social Theory (Notes Towards an Althusserian Critical Theory)”; Sotiris, “Philosophy 
of the Encounter,” 148–49. 
50 Althusser, “Elements of Self-Criticism,” 115. 
51 Althusser, “Marx in His Limits,” 32–33. By the end of 1978, Althusser had given 
up trying to identify Marx’s philosophy with dialectical materialism and crossed the 
term out from texts he was in the process of writing. He replaced it with the other 
terms mentioned above; see Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-
philosophes, 375. 
18
Décalages, Vol. 2 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 22
http://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol2/iss1/22
  
19 
[dialectical materialism.]”52 This Stalinist formula, he notes, has historically 
deformed historical materialism; it has subordinated Marxist science to the 
“philosophy” of dialectical materialism and to its laws. Why has this 
subordination occurred? Althusser suggests that one reason may be the 
influence of bourgeois ideology (in the form of bourgeois philosophy) on 
the communist movement. However, he does not believe it is simply this. 
The complementary reason he cites for historical materialism’s 
subordination is the perennial need for philosophy and especially for idealist 
philosophy to totalize, unify, and control all.53 Against this tendency, 
Althusser continues, “the sciences always present a certain danger to the 
established order…they always have the smell of materialism and of liberty 
about them…”54 
 Because they present this danger, Althusser explains, idealist 
philosophy working on behalf of the established order tries to control the 
sciences and, simultaneously, to provide them with their epistemological 
guarantee. In providing this guarantee and by placing dialectical materialism 
over and above historical materialism an existing political situation can be 
justified or one can end up responding incorrectly to the actual political 
demands of a situation. When philosophy is placed in this dominant 
                                                 
52 Althusser, “ALT2. A22-01.02, Texte de Louis Althusser sur la philosophie 
marxiste.”  
…il est surprenant, du point du vue marxiste d'entendre affirmer qu'une 
science (le Matérialisme historique) est partie intégrante d'une philosophie (le 
Matérialisme dialectique). 
53 Ibid.  
C'est clair pour la fonction apologétique de la philosophie : si la philosophie se 
met au pouvoir sur les sciences, c'est  pour leur extorquer l'aveu philosophique 
d'un sens dont elle a besoin pour boucler son système au service de l'idéologie 
dominante, contre le matérialisme. C'est clair aussi pour les fonctions de 
contrôle et de garantie, puisque dans les deux cas il s'agit d'orienter les 
sciences ou de les confiner dans un domine limité, pour bien s'assurer qu'elles 
se tiendront tranquille à la place que leur assigne l'idéologie dominante.  
54 Ibid.  
…les sciences présentent toujours un certain danger pour l'ordre établi, ne 
serait-ce que parce qu'elles  ont toujours une certaine odeur de matérialisme et 
de liberté?  
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position it is charged with a huge number of strategic tasks, which it works 
on without the benefit of the sciences. Althusser’s chief examples of these 
tasks are that of defining what is human or what is good for humanity and 
of deciding based on these understandings what are to be socialism’s and 
communism’s main goals. However, by appealing only to philosophy to 
make such definitions and to decide on its objectives, it sets up the 
Communist Party’s direction (which has the power to dogmatically dictate 
Marxist philosophy) as the communist movement’s sole authority.55 
Althusser concludes these texts with a warning, a wager, and a promise. The 
warning is that “when scientific analyses are lacking, it is necessary that 
something else take their place. It is taken by philosophy.” 56 The wager is 
that “Marxist philosophy has everything to gain from the abandonment of 
all [philosophical] formulas” and that “the Marxist movement has 
everything to gain from the correction of the practices which follow from 
adherence to these formulas.” The promise is that “the worker’s movement 
today…has everything to gain by making use of scientific, theoretical, 
historical, and concrete analyses.”57 
                                                 
55 Ibid.  
Et derrière cette justification, derrière cette mise au pouvoir de la philosophie 
sur la science marxiste- léniniste, se profilait une autre justification, où il était 
aussi question de pouvoir: la justification du dirigeant du Parti à dire le dernier 
mot sur toutes les questions, y compris les questions scientifiques, ce qui 
supposait non seulement une certaine conception du rapport entre la 
philosophie et les sciences, mais aussi une certaine conception du rapport 
entre le dirigeant et le Parti, le Parti et l'État, et le Parti et les masses, et aussi, 
bien entendu, une certaine conception de la lutte des classes. 
56 Ibid. 
…lorsque les analyses scientifiques manquent, il faut bien que leur place soit 
prise: elle est prise par la philosophie. 
57 Ibid. 
Pour tout dire, la philosophie marxiste n'a rien à perdre, mais tout à gagner, en 
abandonnant les formules  dont la fonction d'apologétique, de contrôle  et de 
garantie sont évidentes. Et si, comme c'est à parier, ces fonctions ont des effets 
pratiques réels, les marxistes ont tout à gagner à la rectification de ces 
pratiques. Oui, tout à gagner. Et pour me limiter à un seul point, je dirais que 
le Mouvement ouvrier a tout à gagner aujourd'hui à disposer des analyses 
scientifiques, théoriques, historiques et concrètes, qui lui manquent 
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 In this warning about the deformation of Marxist science and of 
Marxist political practice by the rationalizing force of idealist philosophy, 
one can see Althusser’s consistent idea that scientific knowledge is what the 
Marxist movement needs in order to correctly direct its political practice. In 
their condemnation of philosophy as being for the most part idealist and as 
serving bourgeois interests, one can also see in the Textes divers sur la 
philosophie the emergence of a position characteristic of Althusser’s aleatory 
materialism. This is not surprising as more than one observer has noted that 
many of the ideas that were to characterize the Materialism of the 
Encounter are clearly present in documents from this period.58 
 The co-existence of recognizably Aleatory Materialist ideas with ideas 
that we have already labeled as scientistic is also found in an unpublished 
manuscript from 1976. Titled “Être marxiste en philosophie,” This text begins 
with a critique of philosophies which try to totalize all entities and 
occurrences and which posit an origin as well as an end to the world. Part of 
this manuscript reads just like the criticism of idealist historiography that is 
found in writings from the 1980s.59 In addition, it includes a discussion of 
the “givenness” of the world (citing Heidegger positively) and lauds 
Epicurus for his idea of contingency and of the encounter. Further, it 
includes the idea of a Kulturkampf in philosophy between materialist and 
idealist camps.60 
 However, notwithstanding all the thematic similarities to Althusser’s 
Aleatory Materialist writings, at a certain point there is a clear shift to 
                                                 
cruellement: je ne parle pas d'analyses d'inspiration philosophique, mais des 
analyses scientifiques… 
58 Goshgarian, “Translator’s Introduction,” xvi–xvii, xlv–xlviii; Goshgarian, “The 
Very Essence of the Object, the Soul of Marxism and Other Singular Things,” 89–90; 
Beaulieu, “La politique de Gilles Deleuze et le matérialisme aléatoire du dernier 
Althusser˚,” 162–163. 
59Althusser, “ALT2. A25-01.03, Être marxiste en philosophie, chapters 13-24 
(1976),” 10–13. 
60 Ibid., 72–73, 98–100, 110–112. 
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science and a justification of Marxist scientific practice that the published 
writings associated with the materialism of the encounter do not make as 
clearly. In fact, there is a long and rather surprising section in Être marxiste en 
philosophie,” where Althusser points out his agreement with Karl Popper on 
the criterion for distinguishing a scientific theory from other types of ideas. 
Though he does not agree with Popper that we can say in advance whether 
a scientific theory is falsifiable, he does concur with Popper’s point that 
hypotheses that cannot be invalidated by experience are not scientific.61 
 If historical materialism is a science, Althusser maintains, it must be 
able to be validated. If this is so, then in what way is its results validated? 
Historical materialism, Althusser explains, like mathematics and 
psychoanalysis, presents a special case among the sciences because its results 
are not experimentally reproducible. Mathematics is distinct because the 
objects that it studies are not material; rather, it has for its object the results 
of its prior practices. Its demonstrations therefore do not consist of 
experimental proofs, but in a logical reordering or analysis of its objects.62 
Psychoanalysis and historical materialism are unique as well, Althusser 
maintains, because, in contrast to the natural sciences which study the 
material real and whose findings (as theoretical representations of universal 
elements) are or should be infinitely reproducible, they have for their object  
complex historical singularities or “conjunctures.” Unlike the universal 
elements that natural science studies, the moment of the class struggle 
                                                 
61 Althusser, “ALT2. A25-01.02, Être marxiste en philosophie, chapters 1-12 (1976),” 
19. 
L’expérience historique  (et les exemples foissonent) montre au contraire 
qu’on ne peut jamais décider d’avance si telle théorie est scientifique ou non,  
c-à-d sera ou non vérifiée ou infirmée (démentie) par l’expérimentation. On 
peut même soutenir l’idée qu’il existe des théorie scientifique, comme le 
marxisme et la psychanalyse, bêtes noires de Popper…qui échappent 
apparemment aux “critères” de la vérification et du démenti expérimental, car 
les expériences qui y sont pratiquées ne peuvent pas être reproduisent dans des 
conditions absolument identiques. 
62 Ibid., 20–21.  
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studied by historical materialism or the moment in a subject’s psyche 
analyzed by depth psychology “is singular and only defines and describes 
itself progressively in the course of the analysis or of the struggle itself.63 This 
does not mean that these science’s findings cannot be confirmed, only that 
they are confirmed by experience but not by ‘experiment.’”64 In this sense, 
the proof of historical materialism’s and psychoanalysis’ truth is “inseparable 
from the direct transformation of their object[s].”65 
 The rudiments of such a practical transformation and therefore of 
such a validation are spelled out in more detail in a book written by 
Althusser between 1976 and 1978 (but only recently edited and published) 
titled Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes. In a chapter devoted to 
“Philosophy and the Science of Class Struggle,” Althusser imagines how and 
under what conditions such a transformation (and thereby confirmation) is 
possible. He supposes that the conditions for such a transformation are the 
following. First, that the members of a non-exploitative class become 
unified in their understanding of themselves as exploited subjects and that 
they do so by subscribing to a philosophy that facilitates this unification. 
Then, if that class “arms itself with a scientific theory of class struggle, the 
conditions of that philosophy’s elaboration will change completely.” This 
philosophy will change from a “blind” and subjective class ideology 
expressing and ensuring that class’s relation to the dominant mode of 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 21bis.  
Ce qui distingue le dispositif expérimental des sciences de la nature du 
dispositif du marxisme et de la PA [psychanalyse], c’est que le premier est 
monté de toutes pièces, en fonction d’éléments universels parfaitement définis 
au départ, alors que dans la cure analytique et dans la lutte des classes, ils sont 
singuliers et ne se décrivent et définissent que progressivement au cours de la 
cure et de la lutte. 
64 Ibid., 20, 21bis.  
65 Ibid., 21bis.  
… chacun voit bien que la théorie [psycho]analytique et la théorie marxiste à 
la différence des autres pratiques scientifiques, sont inséparables de la 
transformation directe de leur objet. 
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production to an objective and “conscious determination, assured by 
scientific knowledge of [that relation’s] conditions, of its forms, of its 
laws.”66 
 This philosophy (just like all philosophies) will then be deployed 
politically. It will suggest to politicians, or at least to those who can direct 
the expression of political power, the reasons and objective means for the 
transformation of these relations. From this will follow a political line.67 As 
Althusser maintains in another document from the same period, if this 
philosophy does not include objective, social scientific knowledge of 
existing relations–of that which produces and sustains them and of what 
tendencies in them might allow for their transformation–and if the 
philosophy does not grow and change from lessons learned in the course of 
its implementation, then there is no hope of choosing the correct line and 
for the transformation of existing relations.68 Without this knowledge, the 
philosophy expressed by the non-exploitative class and the political choices 
that follow from it are easily influenced and countered not only by the 
dominant ideology, but also by the repressive state apparatuses (army, state, 
                                                 
66   Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes, 364. 
Mais supposez une classe qui n’exploite personne, lutte pour sa libération et 
pour la suppression des classes ; supposez que, dans son combat, cette même 
classe entreprenne de s’unifier elle-même en unifiant son idéologie de classe, 
et unifie cette idéologie en forgeant une philosophie qui parvienne à cette 
unification ; alors, si cette classe est armée d’une théorie scientifique de la 
lutte des classes, les conditions de l’élaboration de sa philosophie changent du 
tout au tout. Car la dépendance dans laquelle cette philosophie va 
nécessairement se trouver à l’égard de l’idéologie politique du prolétariat ne 
sera pas une servitude aveugle, mais, au contraire, une détermination 
consciente, assurée par la connaissance scientifique de ses conditions, de ses 
formes, et de ses lois. 
67 Ibid., 364–65. 
Nous pouvons maintenant avancer qu’elles peuvent être dites « justes », si cet 
adjectif « juste » désigne l’effet d’un ajustement prenant en compte tous les 
éléments d’une situation donnée dans laquelle une classe lutte pour atteindre 
ses objectifs. « Juste » est alors l’adjectif non de la justice, catégorie morale, 
mais de la justesse, catégorie pratique, qui indique l’adaptation des moyens 
aux fins, en fonction de la nature de classe de celui qui les poursuit. 
68  Althusser, “Que Faire? (1978),” 17–24.  
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police, laws, courts, etc.),69 which guarantee the reproduction of the 
conditions of the proletariat’s exploitation .70 
 In the spring of 1980, Althusser gave an interview to his friend, 
Italian journalist Giorgio Fanti.71 In it, he answered wide-ranging queries 
about present political issues, about the difference between Italian and 
French communist parties, about the current crisis in the communist 
movement, and about how to resolve it. He also reflected on his career as a 
whole and offered up some reflections on the relations between philosophy, 
science, and politics. Regarding Marxist philosophy, Althusser stated in no 
uncertain terms his judgment that “dialectical materialism” as it had been 
historically formulated through the course of the Marxist movement is 
“absolutely indefensible” and that it has nothing to do with Marx’s 
philosophy.72 Though less detailed than the balance sheet provided in the 
1978 essay  “Marx in his Limits,” Althusser supported this contention by 
tallying up the idealistic philosophical mistakes committed not only by 
Marx’s interpreters, but also by Marx himself.73 
When asked by Fanti whether his rejection of dialectical materialism for a 
version of Marx’s position in philosophy that Althusser now referred to as 
“sur-matérialisme” or “hyper-matérialisme,” meant a change to his position 
regarding the Marxist science of historical materialism, Althusser offered a 
detailed and passionate reply. He began by saying that his core argument 
had not changed and that “we must defend in the trenches the idea that 
Marxism is a revolutionary science.”74 Further, though he continued to 
disavow his earlier position that there is a definitive break in Marx’s 
                                                 
69 Althusser, Sur la reproduction, 95–95. 
70  Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes, 362. 
71 Althusser, “AL T2. A46-04.05, Entretien avec Giorgio Fanti.” 
72 Ibid., 51–52. 
73 Althusser, “Marx in His Limits,” 26–61. 
74 Althusser, “AL T2. A46-04.05, Entretien avec Giorgio Fanti,” 52. 
J’ai dit alors qu’il fallait défendre dans la tranchée l’idée que le marxisme est 
une science révolutionnaire. 
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philosophy when Marx rejects idealist philosophy and becomes scientific, 
Althusser told his interviewer that that there remains a discernable 
difference between Marx’s scientific ideas (which are sound and potentially 
transformative) and his philosophical ideas (which were mostly bourgeois 
and ideological).75 When Fanti asked a follow-up question about whether or 
not Althusser had said in 1973 that dialectical materialism was the 
undeniable core to Marx’s thought,76 Althusser replied: 
“No, no. On the contrary, for me, [this core] is historical 
materialism… If this word designated something, it was that 
there was something scientific in Marx. It remains to be seen if 
the extent of the scientific ground opened by Marx was 
effectively as big as we had believed it to be, as Marx believed, 
etc. What I have always defended is the idea that there is 
something scientific in Marx, and I will defend that always.77 
 
 
3. Althusser 1982-1987: Marxist philosophy without Marxist Science?  
 The 1980 interview with Giorgio Fanti contains Althusser’s last 
recorded and edited thoughts on the relations between philosophy, science, 
and politics prior to the two-year philosophical caesura occasioned by 
Althusser’s murder of his wife, Hélène Rytmann on November 16, 1980. 
Some readers have argued that Althusser’s thought underwent a change 
during this interval or that a change begun in 1975 or 1976 was solidified. 
These analysts maintain that when Althusser began writing again in the 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 50–51. 
76 Fanti is probably misremembering the line from Althusser, “Elements of Self-
Criticism,” 117. where Althusser states: “Yes, it is quite correct for us to speak of an 
unimpeachable and undeniable scientific core in Marxism, that of historical 
materialism.” 
77 Althusser, “AL T2. A46-04.05, Entretien avec Giorgio Fanti,” 51–52. 
Non, non. Pour moi le matérialisme historique, contrairement ! Justement Si 
ce mot désignait quelque chose, c’était ce qu’il pouvait y avoir de scientifique 
dans Marx. Quitte à voir, si effectivement, l’extension du domaine scientifique 
ouvert par Marx était aussi grande qu’on avait pu le croire, que Marx le 
croyait, etc….Ce que j’ai toujours défendu c’est l’idée qu’il y avait quelque 
chose de scientifique dans Marx, et ça je le défends toujours.  
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summer of 1982 it was with a profoundly changed view of the relation 
between Marxist philosophy, Marxist science, and Marxist politics. In this 
new assessment, Marxist science was dismissed while ontology and politics 
were foregrounded. Exploring neither the plausibility of this claim nor its 
possible external political and philosophical motivations,78 this section of 
the paper will briefly explore how some readers have argued that there was 
such a modification in Althusser’s attitude towards science in his idea of 
philosophy after 1980.  
 Within Althusser scholarship, there is a divide between those who 
emphasize a continuist reading of his work and those who emphasizes its 
breaks. The “breakist” understanding, which emphasizes the changes or 
ruptures in his thought, was in the majority in the 1990s and remains a 
popular interpretive rubric. Almost all who hold this position argue that 
Althusser renounced his scientism in his last works.79 However, among 
those scholars who have worked extensively with posthumously published 
materials and who have tried to comprehend the arc of his career, a 
continuist consensus has emerged over the last decade that focuses on the 
permanence of certain themes in Althusser’s work. These themes include 
the primacy of relations, the idea of the conjuncture, the claim that history is 
a process without a subject, and the idea of philosophy as a void.80 Even 
amongst the continuists, however, a significant majority explicitly holds the 
                                                 
78 Garo, “<<Il Pleut>> – Matérialisme de la rencontre et politique du vide chez le 
dernier Althusser.” In this essay Garo offers a comprehensive assessment of the 
political and philosophical climate that may have encouraged the foregrounding of 
ontology and politics in Althusser’s work in the mid 1980s.  
79 Bargu, “In the Theater of Politics”; Bensaïd, “Un univers de pensée aboli,” 253; 
Diefenbach, “Althusser with Deleuze”; Elliott, “Postscript”; Garo, “<<Il Pleut>> – 
Matérialisme de la rencontre et politique du vide chez le dernier Althusser”; Haider 
and Mohandesi, “Underground Currents”; Navarro, “An Encounter with Althusser,” 
96; Thomas, “Althusser’s Last Encounter”; Williams, “Althusser and Spinoza,” 73–
74. 
80 Morfino, “An Althusserian Lexicon”; Goshgarian, “The Very Essence of the 
Object, the Soul of Marxism and Other Singular Things”; Matheron, “The Recurrence 
of the Void in Louis Althusser.” 
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position that Althusser gave up his scientism in the 1980s or else supports 
this position implicitly by emphasizing only the political and philosophical 
aspects of Althusser’s thought from this period.81 Despite a near consensus 
among his readers that Althusser gave up his scientism in the 1980s, there is 
a contingent of continuists who argue that Althusser’s scientism remains 
consistent throughout his career.82 One purpose of the present paper is to 
provide more and better evidence of this consistency. 
 The next few paragraphs will summarize the accounts of a few 
representative readers who explicitly maintain that Althusser gave up his 
scientism in the 1980s. This survey will begin with one interpreter who 
accentuates the break from Althusser’s earlier philosophical positions with 
the advent of aleatory materialism. It will then review the readings of two 
representative continuists, both of whom maintain that–despite the deep 
continuities discernible in Althusser's philosophy as a whole–his later 
philosophy lacks the scientistic element that had previously marked his 
thought. Following this review, the form, presentation, and content of 
Althusser’s posthumously published work on the materialism of the 
encounter will be examined in order to show why, based on these texts, 
there are perhaps good reasons for thinking that Althusser altered his 
position on the role of science in his political philosophy as a whole. In 
addition to a close and comparative reading of Althusser’s published and 
                                                 
81 Beaulieu, “La Politique de Gilles Deleuze et Le Matérialisme Aléatoire Du Dernier 
Althusser˚”; Boer, “Althusser’s Catholic Marxism”; Del Lucchese tr. Warren Montag, 
“On the Emptiness of an Encounter”; Gillot, “Althusser, Wittgenstein, et la question 
du sujet”; Ichida and Matheron, “Un, Deux, Trois, Quatre, Dix Mille Althusser?”; 
Illas, “The Procrustean Bed of Class Struggle”; Lahtinen, Politics and Philosophy, 87; 
Matheron, “The Recurrence of the Void in Louis Althusser”; Moulier-Boutang, “Le 
Matérialisme Comme Politique Aléatoire”; Fernández Liria, “Regreso al <<Campo de 
Batalla>>”; Thomas, “Althusser’s Last Encounter,” 148. 
82 Goshgarian, “Translator’s Introduction,” 95; Haider and Mohandesi, “Underground 
Currents”; Kirn, “Between the Tenth and Eleventh Theses on Feuerbach,” 346–47; 
Sotiris, “Philosophy of the Encounter,” 170; Suchting, “Althusser’s Late Thinking 
about Materialism”; Tosel, “The Hazards of Aleatory Materialism in the Late 
Philosophy of Louis Althusser,” 15. 
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unpublished texts from the late 1970s and 80s, the final section of this paper 
will make use of one “continuist non-breakist” reading of aleatory 
materialism to support its contention that Althusser’s writings include a 
mostly consistent understanding of the relations between scientific 
knowledge and political action. 
 
3.1 Althusser’s Scientism abandoned? 
 The best-known identifier of a break in Althusser’s thought is 
Antonio Negri. In a frequently cited essay that appeared only two years after 
the collections that contained the bulk of Althusser’s reflections on aleatory 
materialsim (Sur la philosophie and Ecrits philosophiques et politiques, Tome 1) were 
published, Negri argues that Althusser’s last writings evidence a profound 
kehre or turn in his thought. Negri pegs the beginning of this turn to 
Althusser’s rereading of Machiavelli in 1978. At this time, Negri maintains, 
“the structural framework of Althusser’s previous theoretical analysis is 
completely reversed: theory does not show the convergences and 
consequences, in a structural and systemic manner; on the contrary, it shows 
ruptures, paradoxes, voids and points of crisis.”83 This structural change, 
Negri argues, firmly took hold by the early 1980s. At this time and in the 
works comprising the corpus of aleatory materialism, Althusser developed 
“an ontological conception of crisis as key to an understanding of the 
historical process and as motor of the transformation of the real.”84 In this 
ateleological universe constituted solely of discrete materials bound and 
sundered only by “chance and event,” a revolutionary struggle can happen 
anywhere and at any time. No longer burdened by a “distinction between 
ideological and non-ideological thinking”85 or by the need to scientifically 
analyze the conditions of a revolution, any subject “in the open freedom of 
                                                 
83 Negri, “Notes on the Evolution of the Thought of Louis Althusser,” 54. 
84 Ibid., 59. 
85 Ibid., 63. 
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the surface” can assert an aleatory revolutionary thesis , (“a revolutionary 
truth unacceptable to the given conditions”86), which may have the 
possibility of overturning current theoretical practices. At least as Negri 
interprets Althusser, aleatory materialism includes a denial of the difference 
between ideological and scientific knowledge and, therefore, of the practical 
efficacy of scientific knowledge in politics. Because, according to Negri, any 
given condition is subject to change by an unexpected event, it is 
simultaneously an affirmation of the supremacy of philosophy (which may 
operate in the void beyond current theoretical practices) in politics.87 
 Negri’s position on aleatory materialism is extremely loose and 
schematic and it takes many liberties in its citations, interpretations, and 
overall argumentation. Probably not coincidentally, the aleatory materialism 
described by Negri anticipates and prophetically justifies many of the 
positions that Negri was simultaneously asserting in his own work.88 
However, even among those readers who are not so obviously involved in 
acts of creative appropriation, who read Althusser carefully, and who take 
an overall continuist view of his work, the thesis that aleatory materialism 
includes a renunciation of Althusser’s philosophy’s scientistic elements 
remains an influential interpretation. 
 Among the proponents of the view that aleatory materialism–despite 
its fundamental continuity with the rest of his oeuvre–includes a 
renunciation of his political philosophy’s scientistic element is Althusser’s 
biographer, Yann Moulier-Boutang. In a 1997 article that is mostly 
concerned with the relation between Althusser’s biography and his 
contradictory philosophical claims, Moulier-Boutang states that the 
theoretical crisis brought on by Althusser’s relinquishment of dialectical 
                                                 
86 Ibid., 54. 
87 Ibid., 62. 
88 Day, “The Aleatory Encounter and the Common Name Reading Negri Reading 
Althusser”; Read, “To Think the New in the Absence of Its Conditions.” 
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materialism led around 1975 or 1976 to the “abandonment of historical 
materialism” and its “apparatus of scientific laws of history…in favor of a 
logic of the singular situation, of the pure political practice of the aleatory 
encounter.”89 The details of this abandonment are provided by Moulier-
Boutang in a 2005 essay titled “Le matérialisme comme politique aléatoire .” 
In this paper, Moulier-Boutang connects aleatory materialism with the logic 
of overdetermination developed by Althusser in the early 1960s.90 In 
addition to persuasively forging this connection, Moulier-Boutang argues 
that, with the materialism of the encounter, Althusser gave up on the idea of 
using Marx’s historical materialist scientific tools to engage in “the concrete 
analysis of the concrete situation.”91 As he sees it, Althusser abandoned this 
idea in his later works because he grasped that “revolution is an irreducible, 
unpredictable, ‘overdetermined’ event” and because the idea of univocal 
causality and the assumption of continuity in nature cannot expla in such 
revolutionary occurrences.92 With this realization, Moulier-Boutang 
maintains, Althusser put to one side his older supposition that historical 
change happens in an orderly and predictable way as well as the 
corresponding idea that, because of this orderliness, scientific analysis of the 
present conjuncture will allow one to understand how to occasion 
revolutionary change. The prior ontological assumption of orderliness was 
replaced with the supposition of “the absolutely arbitrary character of 
                                                 
89 Moulier-Boutang, “L’interdit Biographique et L’autorisation de L’oeuvre.”  
“La solution théorique vers laquelle Althusser se dirige à partir de 1975-76 est 
l’abandon du matérialisme historique, avec la crise du marxisme: l’appareil 
scientifique des lois de l’histoire (mode de productions, succession, 
transition), conjurateur de l’angoisse, est désinvesti, au profit d’une logique du 
cas singulier, de la pratique politique pure (Machiavel et nous) de la rencontre 
aléatoire.” 
90 Moulier-Boutang, “Le Matérialisme Comme Politique Aléatoire,” 163. 
91 Ibid., 162. 
92 Ibid., 163. 
“La révolution est un événement irréductible, imprévisib le, « surdéterminé ». 
La causalité univoque, la continuité ne sont d’aucune utilité.”   
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existence.”93 Further, the idea of the usefulness of concrete analysis for first 
understanding and then precipitating revolutionary change gave way in 
Althusser’s late thought to the idea that an aleatory materialist ontology 
demands that we think of revolutionary politics as an art rather than as a 
science.94 As a practitioner of this art of revolution, Moulier-Boutang 
explains, the aleatory materialist philosopher stops looking at what was and 
what is in order to see what can be changed in the future; he does so 
because he recognizes that the relation between present patterns and future 
possibilities is always uncertain.95 Akin to and inspired by Machiavelli, such a 
philosopher instead steps into an existing situation and attempts to found an 
absolutely new political regime where one has not before existed. To do so, 
he or she must “think of politics as the meeting of the conditions of 
becoming, of that which is not still, of that which is otherwise missed.” 96 
 Like Moulier-Boutang in 2005 but in much more detail, Mikko 
Lahtinen in his 2008 book Politics and Philosophy: Niccolo Machiavelli and Louis 
Althusser's Aleatory Materialism attempts to show what Althusser’s late 
thinking on the materialism of the encounter owes to his reading(s) of 
Machiavelli. As with Moulier-Boutang, this account includes the thesis that 
aleatory materialism includes a renunciation of the scientistic elements of 
Althusser’s political philosophy. Along with many others, Lahtinen is critical 
of the scientism in Althusser’s work prior to 1980. He correctly recognizes 
that between 1960 and 1965 Althusser sought to position Marxism “as a 
                                                 
93 Ibid. 
“La…caractère absolument aléatoire de l’existence n’apparaît pas comme 
thème philosophique chez Louis Althusser avant la rencontre avec 
Machiavel.” 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., 162. 
96 Ibid., 164. 
“…il pense la politique comme la réunion des conditions de l’avènement de ce 
qui n’est pas encore, qui a d’ailleurs raté.” 
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high-standard science able to withstand critique.”97 He also rightly notices 
that later, during the period of his self-criticism, Althusser became less 
optimistic about the possibility of separating science from ideology (even as 
Althusser still insisted that critical science was essential to the revolutionary 
movement).98 When the book comes to its interpretation of Althusser’s 
aleatory materialism, however, Lahtinen contends that the idea of science 
did not play an important role in Althusser’s late political philosophy. With 
aleatory materialism, Lahtinen maintains, Althusser renounced even the 
epistemologically modest idea, which dated from the period of his self-
criticism that Marxism should be thought of as a critical science perpetually 
on guard against its idealist contents and suppositions. He replaced it, 
Lahtinen argues, with a “philosophy for Marxism,” which understands itself 
as a non-scientific critical political practice. Lahtinen traces the reason for 
this change to Althusser’s reflections on Machiavelli. Through these 
sustained (if intermittent) readings, Lahtinen argues, Althusser developed an 
increasingly subjectivist epistemological position, one of whose 
consequences was a changed understanding of the relationship between 
politics and philosophy. 
 The basic argument of Lahtinen runs like this. From his sustained 
reading of Machiavelli, Althusser learned that an objective standpoint on 
politics is impossible and that “the effects of coincidences and exceptions 
on human life” as well as the perspectival nature of all political knowledge 
made a “general theory about human life or praxis in general” likewise 
unrealizable.99 This new awareness excluded the possibility of an objective, 
universal, “modern” political science upon which a revolutionary science of 
politics might be based.100 However, according to Lahtinen, Althusser also 
                                                 
97 Lahtinen, Politics and Philosophy, 74. 
98 Ibid., 77, 81. 
99 Ibid., 123. 
100 Ibid., 117. 
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absorbed from Machiavelli the lesson that the subjective knowledge of a 
particular political situation from a particular perspective is not the sole type 
of knowledge available to the aleatory materialist philosopher but that this 
practical knowledge is desirable for the philosopher who wishes to 
encourage revolutionary change. Because politics is not predictable in the 
same way as physics, knowledge of a conjuncture (of a particular socio-
economic-historical arrangement) cannot come from an understanding of 
the general laws of social organization or from laboratory-like experiments 
on persons or on social groupings.101 Rather, in order to be effective, the 
aleatory materialist philosopher or political actor must study “the constants 
repeated from one case to another, knowledge of which may be useful for 
the political actor planning a strategy of action.” This actor must also be 
sensitive to the workings of chance and to the specifics of his or her 
situation102 Unlike Moulier-Boutang, who goes from the identification of an 
aleatory materialist ontology to the requirement that we think of 
revolutionary politics as an art rather than as a science and also unlike Negri, 
who goes from ontology to rhetoric, for Lahtinen, the ontological portion 
of Althusser’s aleatory materialism appears as secondary or instrumental. 
According to this reading, the primary reason for Althusser abandoning any 
claim to the scientificity in Marxism in his later works is the realization, 
taken from Machiavelli, that as participants we can have no objective 
knowledge of laws animating our social life and that radical changes to our 
social life always appear as a surprise, without knowable antecedent cause or 
causes. 
 
3.2 Internalist explanation of the abandonment thesis 
                                                 
101 Ibid., 162–63, 238. 
102 Ibid., 309–310. 
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 In contrast to Negri’s reading, the accounts of Moulier-Boutang and 
Lahtinen are well sourced and take few liberties with the posthumously 
published texts on aleatory materialism. However, irrespective of the quality 
of the analysis or whether or not their author is a continuist or a breakist, 
the majority of scholars who have engaged with Althusser’s late works have 
come to the conclusion that, in them, Althusser abandons the scientism that 
was hitherto a constant in his political philosophy. As this paper will argue 
in its final section that this is not the case and that aleatory materialism 
represents a prolongation and elaboration of positions and ideas already 
developed in the 1960s and 1970s, we should perhaps seek an explanation 
for why so many readers believe that aleatory materialism represents a 
change from Althusser’s previous endorsement of scientism. 
 Even if we avoid referencing the personal, political and philosophical 
circumstances of their writing, by looking at the selection and editorial 
presentation of the works constituting the aleatory materialism corpus we 
can find sufficient internal explanation for the preponderance of the 
interpretation that Althusser abandons scientism in his work from the 
1980s. Indeed, given the content of the available texts, their presentation, 
and their immediate reception, the conclusion that Althusser dropped his 
scientism appears somewhat warranted. The next two paragraphs will 
examine explicit statements from these texts that tend to support such a 
conclusion. The paragraph that follows them will look at a few relatively 
clear editorial inclusions as a factor in this work’s reception as anti- or non-
scientistic.  
 In both their French and English editions, the philosophical essays 
on aleatory materialism are accompanied by letters which Althusser wrote to 
friends and collaborators and with an interview whose status is somewhere 
35
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between that of original work and collaboration.103 The letters in particular 
provide an account of Althusser’s mental state at the time of the project. 
They also set out its philosophical and political intent as well its historical 
and biographical context. Clearly present in many of these epistles is 
Althusser’s desire to synthesize and present ideas that had been percolating 
for years in an accessible form and to construct a “philosophy for 
Marxism.”104 As this philosophy was presented as “new” or as a break from 
Althusser’s previous work it is little wonder that people have looked to see 
how this work differs from the previous philosophy.105 One can add to this 
the fact that a few of the letters and interviews included passages where 
Althusser seems to denigrate or question his prior work and to problematize 
its account of the sciences.  
 Two letters and two interview responses stand out in particular for 
the way in which they seem to show Althusser in the process of rejecting his 
earlier scientism. In the first, a 1978 letter addressed to the Georgian 
philosopher Merab Mardashvili, Althusser announces himself as being in a 
period of transition and hints at the gestation of the materialism of the 
encounter (no doubt the reason this letter is included).106 He also reflects on 
his previous work and its relation to the sciences, writing: “I see clear as day 
that what I did fifteen years ago was to fabricate a little, typically French 
justification, in a neat little rationalism bolstered with a few references 
(Cavaillès, Bachelard, Canguilhem, and, behind them, a bit of the Spinoza-
Hegel tradition), for Marxism's (historical materialism's) pretension to being 
a science.”107 In another letter, this one from April of 1986 and addressed to 
Fernanda Navarro, Althusser instructs his collaborator on how to edit and 
                                                 
103 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 1–6, 208–251; Althusser, Sur la 
philosophie, 81–137; Goshgarian, “Translator’s Introduction,” xvi. 
104 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 258–59. 
105 Elliott, “Postscript,” 366; Navarro, “An Encounter with Althusser,” 94. 
106 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 5. 
107 Ibid., 3. 
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improve the text of the interview she was conducting with him, writing: “I'd 
like you to drop the passage about 'lines of demarcation' in the sciences, 
particularly the demarcation between the scientific and the ideological, as 
well as everything pertaining to the difference between ideology and the 
ideological.”108  
 In the published interviews, we see two more responses that seem to 
show Althusser in the process of rejecting his earlier scientism. In the first, 
Althusser responds to a question posed by Navarro about the distinctive 
features a materialist philosophy might be said to display with the reply, 
“…it does not claim to be autonomous or to ground its own origin and its 
own power. Nor does it consider itself to be a science, and still less the 
Science of sciences.109 In the second, Althusser replies to a question about 
the nature of history by stating that the objects of Marxism and 
psychoanalysis “belong not to accomplished history but to Geschichte, to 
living history, which is made of, and wells up out of, aleatory tendencies and 
the unconscious. This is a history whose forms have nothing to do with the 
determinism of physical laws.”110  
 In addition to statements and passages like these which seem to imply 
that Althusser was in the process of rethinking the position that Marxism is 
a science or even that he was engaged in this position’s active denigration 
and renunciation, there are also the unfinished 1978 essay “Marx in his 
limits” and the likewise fragmentary  “Machiavelli and Us.” The former was 
published with the aleatory materialist writings while the latter appeared in 
French and English editions during the 1990s alongside prefaces that 
suggested the connection between Althusser’s reading of Machiavelli and 
the materialism of the encounter.111 As has been noted above, one source of 
                                                 
108 Ibid., 287. 
109 Ibid., 274. 
110 Ibid., 264. 
111 Althusser, Ecrits philosophiques et politiques, Tome 2, 40; Elliott, “Introduction: 
In the Mirror of Machiavelli.” 
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the claim that Althusser renounces his scientism are the passages in his 
writing on Machiavelli where Althusser says that he is not interested in 
Machiavelli as a founder of political science but only as a philosopher of the 
contingent event.112 That this may have been a conscious choice of 
Althusser’s to concentrate on the relation between philosophy and politics 
rather than a dismissal of political science tout court, however, seems to have 
been missed.113  
 A similar interpretation appears to have been made in the case of 
“Marx in his Limits” as well as the other “texts of the crisis”: “Marxism 
Today (1978)” and  “The Transformation of Philosophy (1976) .” Each 
speaks extensively of science and of Marxist science.114 However, each does 
so almost exclusively in pejorative terms, enumerating the problems that 
have resulted in the worker’s movement due to its adoptions of certain 
“Marxist scientific” concepts about the material nature of the world, 
concepts that are, in reality, merely idealist philosophical notions.115 The lack 
of any mention of Marxist theory of science in positive terms, as well as the 
diagnosis of a “crisis in Marxism” caused in part by Marxism’s erroneous 
scientific claims might lead one to conclude that, during the late 1970s’ 
“crisis of Marxism,” Althusser abandoned his longstanding claim that 
Marxism is a science, that this science is historical materialism, and that its 
object is the history of class struggle. Indeed, some read these texts as 
announcing this repudiation. For example, one of Althusser’s best readers, 
Gregory Elliott, was moved to interpret these texts in this way. In a post-
script and intellectual balance sheet included with the second edition of The 
Detour of Theory (2006) he wrote:   
                                                 
112 Lahtinen, Politics and Philosophy, 117–18; Elliott, “Introduction: In the Mirror of 
Machiavelli,” xvii. 
113 Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, 11. 
114 Althusser, “Marx in His Limits”; Althusser, “Marxism Today”; Althusser, “La 
transformation de la philosophie – Conférence de Grenade (1976).” 
115 Cavazzini, Crise du marxisme et critique de l’État. 
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Around 1976, a new period [of Althusser’s work] begins, 
which is one not of the auto-critique, but of the auto-
deconstruction – even self-destruction – of Althusserianism 
and the radical problematisation of the scientificity of Marxism 
itself. It is most dramatically attested to in the 1977 talk ‘The 
Crisis of Marxism’ and the 1978 encyclopaedia article 
‘Marxism Today’ – texts whose content overlaps with that of 
the abandoned manuscript on ‘Marx in His Limits’. Writings 
of a break, they can also be regarded as in some sense 
transitional works, paving the way for a final period of 
Althusserian production.116  
 
 
4. An aleatory materialism consistent with Marxist Science?  
 In the preceding section we have suggested why, given the form, 
presentation, and content of the published texts, readers of Althusser might 
come to hold the position that he gave up his scientism in the 1980s. 
Nonetheless, given the manifest consistency of his scientism prior to 1980 
(as detailed in section 2 of this paper and summarized again below), we have 
reason to be suspicious of this inference. Another reason to mistrust this 
conclusion is that the information that it is based upon is partial: the  bulk 
of Althusser’s writings having to do with the materialism of the encounter 
and its gestation remain unpublished.117 In addition, the principal texts 
which develop this philosophy have been subject to marked editorial 
interventions. For instance, in order to compose the essay “The 
Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter,” the 
introductory chapters of the book provisionally entitled J'écris ce livre en octobre 
1982 were cut. These chapters include an evaluation of the present 
                                                 
116 Elliott, “Postscript,” 366. 
117 Althusser, “«Sur le mode de production»”; Althusser, “La grande répétition de 
l’histoire”; Althusser, “Ouvrage sans titre commençant par : «J’écris ce livre en 
octobre 1982».”; Althusser, “«La philosophie c’est enfantin».”; Althusser, “Qu’y 
faire ? Que faire ?”; Althusser, “Thèses de juin.” 
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conjuncture and specific recommendations for political action.118 Rather 
than presenting J'écris ce livre en octobre 1982 as Althusser unambiguously 
intended–as an attempt to think the (then) present conjuncture “otherwise,” 
this omission gives the appearance that, in one of the two principal texts on 
aleatory materialism, Althusser was exclusively involved in the development 
(exhumation?) of a politico-ontological philosophical tradition.119 In 
addition to debatable rearrangements, comparable omissions mark that 
other principal aleatory materialism text, “Philosophy and Marxism: 
Interviews with Fernanda Navarro.” Also missing from consideration or, in 
the case of Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes, only recently 
published, are numerous texts from the 1970s (some of them book-length) 
which clearly contain aleatory materialist arguments and concepts and that 
may or may not corroborate the thesis that Althusser was in the process of 
abandoning his scientism or that this abandonment went along with aleatory 
materialism’s development.120  
 Except for in one instance where Althusser gave specific permission 
that a text be edited and published posthumously (and that only in Latin 
America), there is little reason to privilege the published texts over those still 
held in the archive.121 Therefore, in trying to make the judgment of whether 
                                                 
118 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 164; Althusser, “Ouvrage sans titre 
commençant par : «J’écris ce livre en octobre 1982».,” 17–30. According to its 
editors, these sections of the book were omitted because they consisted of:  
“exchanges of opinion, of dubious value because they are not justified, not 
defended, not supported by textual citations or convincing examples.” 
However, given their misleading and erroneous citations, the dubious 
interpretations of philosophers both modern and contemporary, and the quality 
of argumentation, the sections that were included in the book might fall under 
these same criticisms. 
119 Althusser, “Ouvrage sans titre commençant par : «J’écris ce livre en octobre 
1982».” 
120 Althusser, “ALT2. A22-01.02, Texte de Louis Althusser sur la philosophie 
marxiste”; Althusser, “ALT2. A25-01.02, Être marxiste en philosophie, chapters 1-12 
(1976)”; Althusser, “ALT2. A25-01.03, Être marxiste en philosophie, chapters 13-24 
(1976)”; Althusser, “Que Faire? (1978)”; Althusser, Louis, “Cours sur le mode 
d’exposition chez Marx.” 
121 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 249–50 fn30. 
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or not, in his later works, Althusser abandoned his scientism, it is both licit 
and important to consider the unpublished writings. To the end of making 
such a determination, the next section of the paper will examine relevant 
passages from the posthumous collections of Althusser’s writings as well as 
some texts from the period 1982-1987 that remain unpublished. In so 
doing, it will provide a counter-reading to those accounts which argue that 
Althusser gave up his scientism in the late 1970s as well as to those which 
claim that Althusser’s thought emerged in 1982 cleansed of its previous 
scientism. The primary goals of this counter-reading will be to demonstrate 
that Althusser did not abandon his scientism and to show how it appears in 
his later work as a continuous and important part of his Marxist theory. A 
secondary objective will be to account for the seemingly anti-scientistic 
statements detailed above.  
 
4.1 An alternative to the abandonment thesis 
 If one wants to build the argument that Althusser rejected the 
scientistic aspect of his thought in his later works, the claim that he emerged 
in the summer of 1982 after two years marked by trauma, by severe mental 
illness, by institutionalization, and by little access to philosophical materials 
with a profoundly changed view of Marxist thought appears psychologically 
implausible. As it explains the origin of such a change in the context of a 
profound theoretical and political struggle in which Althusser rejected his 
well-known claims about the scientificity of Marxism, the theory that marks 
the origin of this rejection in the texts from “crisis of Marxism” period 
appears the much more likely account. However, based on the sum of 
available evidence is the best reading of what was happening in Althusser’s 
philosophy during the late 1970s and is it the best explanation for the 
genesis of his work from the 1980s? 
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 The examination of  Althusser’s published and unpublished writings 
from 1972-1980 in section 2.3 of this paper showed that he was neither in 
the process of reconsidering the position that Marxism is a science nor that 
he was modifying the corresponding assertion that there is a necessary 
relationship between correct scientific knowledge and effective political 
action. On the contrary, most of the texts from this period emphasize this 
relation. They also show that Althusser attempted to work out the practical 
details of how Marxist science should be pursued and then integrated into 
political decision making. Though some of the published materials display 
little of this effort, the recently published Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-
philosophes (1978) includes an extensive discussion of the relations between 
Marxist philosophy, Marxist science, and Marxist politics as well as a clear 
endorsement of Marxist science.122 In short this book, as well as many other 
lengthy and (as yet) unpublished pieces, show Althusser developing the 
argument in philosophical, practical, and polemical terms that intentional 
political change is best enabled by scientific analyses of the political 
conjuncture.123  
 If it is the case that Althusser did not abandon  his claims about the 
scientificity of Marxism in the late 1970s, then what was he up to in works 
like “Marx in his Limits” and “Marxism Today” that are singled out by some 
critics as evidence of this undoing and which gave rise to this confusion? As 
we have argued, the explanation that fits the available evidence is that 
Althusser was in the process of doing with Marxist science something very 
similar to that which he was simultaneously trying to do with Marxist 
philosophy. Specifically, he was attempting to purge it of its ideological 
components and, therefore, of its idealist content and inheritance.  
                                                 
122 Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes, chapters 4, 9,10, 
17–19. 
123 Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes; Althusser, “Que 
Faire? (1978)”; Althusser, “Les Vâches noires : interview imaginaire”; Althusser, 
“ALT2. A22-01.02, Texte de Louis Althusser sur la philosophie marxiste.” 
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 Rather than condemning Marxist science as a whole, the Marxist 
science that Althusser ruthlessly critique between 1975 and 1980 is the 
version of historical materialism historically paired  with Marxist philosophy 
and that is known as “dialectical materialism.” Understood as “an integral 
part of dialectical materialism” or as a “result of the application of dialectical 
materialism to history,” this version of Marxist science has historically been 
dominated and defined by its dyadic relation with an idealist metaphysics of 
history and of nature.124 That the historical pairing of historical materialism 
and dialectical materialism has had deleterious consequences for the 
worker’s movement, Althusser often marks as obvious between 1976 and 
1980.125 Nevertheless, it does not follow from Althusser’s simultaneous 
dismantling of historical materialism and of dialectical materialism that “the 
core of Marxist thought” is not scientific. After all, simultaneous to these 
critiques, Althusser was in the process of working out what a scientific 
analysis of the present socioeconomic and political conjuncture should 
include.126 He was also arguing that, in order for political action to be 
successful, the communist party must engage in critical social scientific 
analyses of the present conjuncture.127 Further, and as evidenced by the 
Fanti interview and many other texts from this period, Althusser did not shy 
away from calling this analysis “historical materialist.” Seen in this context, 
Althusser’s criticism of historical materialism in the late 1970s appears as 
deeply complementary to his simultaneous elaboration of a renewed 
                                                 
124 Althusser, “ALT2. A22-01.02, Texte de Louis Althusser sur la philosophie 
marxiste.” 
On trouve en effet de nos jours constamment, sous la plume d'auteurs 
marxistes autorisés, la formule suivant : "le matérialisme est partie intégrante 
du matérialisme dialectique."    
125 Althusser, “Marx in His Limits,” 18–33; Althusser, “Marxism Today,” 10–12; 
Althusser, “The Transformation of Philosophy (1976),” 262. 
126 Lewis, “Concrete Analysis and Pragmatic Social Theory (Notes Towards an 
Althusserian Critical Theory),” 97–105. 
127  Althusser, “Les Vâches noires : interview imaginaire,” 22–24. 
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materialist approach to Marxist science and to Marxist philosophy in which 
both are stripped of their relations to idealist metaphysics.  
 As with his critique of Marxist philosophy but to a greater extent, the 
problem of nomenclature arises with this elaboration. In the case of Marxist 
philosophy, Althusser marked the difference between the historical 
iterations of Marxist philosophy that he was trying to dismantle and the 
philosophy for Marxism that he was in the course of developing in the late 
70s by labeling the historical iteration “dialectical materialism” and his 
reconstructed materialism variously as “non-philosophy,” “anti-
philosophy,” and “philosophy for Marxism.” In the 80s, the designations 
for this reconstructed Marxist philosophy grew to include “aleatory 
materialism” and “materialism of the encounter.” Though Althusser was not 
always consistent in his use of these expressions and often employed the 
generic “Marxist philosophy” to refer both to the idealist version of 
Marxism he rejected and to the materialist philosophy he was in the course 
of developing, the distinction had at least been made. Further, the type of 
Marxist philosophy Althusser meant to denote was usually clearly signaled 
by context.128 In contrast, whether Althusser referred to the concept of 
Marxist science as historically dominated by dialectical materialism or to his 
revised version of the concept stripped of its relations to an idealistic 
metaphysics, he habitually referred to each by the same names: “Marxist 
science” and “historical materialism.”  
 That Althusser was in the late 1970s critical of historical materialism 
and that he argued for an alternative understanding of Marxist science, for 
this alternative science’s pursuit, and for its use in political decision making 
should have been made clear in Section 2.3. What has not been made 
explicit though is exactly of what this reconstructed understanding of 
historical materialism consisted. Negatively, we know from Althusser’s 
                                                 
128 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 173–74, 188–89. 
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critique of the relation of Marxist science to dialectical materialism that it is 
an idealist mistake to think that: (a) there are general laws of history and (b) 
that social relations are determined in the manner that physical relations are 
determined.129 We also know from our scrutiny of texts written between 
1975 and 1978 that, in Althusser’s reconstruction, historical materialism has 
the following positive characteristics. First, it is a science that has for its 
object of study the existing forms of class struggle and that has as its goal 
the transformation of its object of study. Because of this goal and the 
changing structures of its object, it defines and describes itself progressively in 
the course of the struggle itself. Second, the characteristics of its object of 
study delimit the type of knowledge that it is possible for it to acquire. 
Unlike the natural sciences which study the material real and whose findings 
(as theoretical representations of universal elements) are or should be 
infinitely reproducible, reconstructed historical materialism has as its object 
complex historical singularities or “conjunctures.” Under analysis, these 
structures reveal tendencies or patterns of relation that endure over time 
and which can be said to differentially order and structure these 
conjunctures in terms of the way in which a tendency is (or is not) expressed 
in relation to the other tendencies that constitute a singular conjuncture.130 
In order to gain knowledge of a specific conjuncture, this version of 
historical materialism synthesizes the findings of the other (non-critical) 
social sciences that it judges to be relevant to understanding the conjuncture 
                                                 
129 Dumenil, Le concept de loi économique dans “Le Capital.” 
130 Although Althusser used this word frequently in his previous work, it is clear that 
by 1978 (and probably by Althusser, “ALT2. A25-01.02, Être marxiste en 
philosophie, chapters 1-12 (1976).”) it had taken on this particular meaning in the 
context of HM2 analysis. For instance in Althusser, “Que Faire? (1978).” Althusser 
writes: 
Tout dépend alors de "l'analyse concrète" de la "situation concrète," de la 
tendance actuelle de la lutte de classe ouvrière et populaire dan sons 
antagonisme avec la lutte de classe bourgeoise, donc de l'analyse concrète de 
cet antagonisme qui constitue à la fois la classe bourgeoise en classe 
dominante et exploiteuse et la classe ouvrière en classe dominée et exploitée. 
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and initiates inquiry into those areas where it finds knowledge lacking . In 
order to help weed out the influence of bourgeois ideology on these 
sciences’ assumptions, methodology, and conclusions, it also subjects this 
knowledge to critical scrutiny.131 The result of all of this labor is a synthetic 
analysis of the present conjuncture and a concrete political recommendation 
for how to transform it. Reflecting the goal and object of the science, the 
validity of this result can only be confirmed practically by the 
transformation of the very object that it has studied: the existing forms of 
the class struggle.132 
 In the last few paragraphs we have summarized the available 
materials in order to detail Althusser’s understanding and endorsement of a 
reconstructed historical materialism in the five years prior to 1980. In so 
doing, we have shown why any analysis that marks out 1975-80 as a period 
of transition away from scientism in Althusser’s thought is incorrect. Not 
only do most of the writings from this period evidence an explicit 
endorsement of historical materialism, they also position it as a science 
separate from any dialectical materialist underpinnings. Though Althusser’s 
understanding and endorsement of historical materialism between 1975 and 
80 differs in some of its details from its earlier conceptualization (and 
particularly that of 1960-1965), his overall position is still recognizably 
scientistic in that he continues to mark out science and particularly the 
Marxist science of historical materialism as the only human theoretical 
practice that allow us to reliably understand socio-economic structures such 
that we might intentionally assist in their transformation.  
 If this summary accurately represents Althusser’s reconstructed 
understanding of historical materialism right before the two year break in 
                                                 
131 Althusser, “Les Vâches noires : interview imaginaire,” 23–23bis. 
[Une analyse concrète] ne peut se passer d’une véritable analyse de ces succès 
et échecs que mette en lumière leur lien dialectique, et le moyen de 
transformer un échec passager en victoire durable. 
132 Althusser, “The Transformation of Philosophy (1976).” 
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philosophical activity which began in the spring of 1980, then the burden of 
proof is yet higher if one hopes to maintain that the 1980s writings on 
aleatory materialism are marked by their sudden rejection of scientism. This 
is the case as many of the ideas that are associated with Althusser’s 
reconstruction of historical materialism clearly appear in the aleatory 
materialist writings. We also know that the development of a reconstructed 
historical materialism and the beginnings of Althusser’s radical revisions to 
Marxist philosophy were simultaneous and that the two projects were 
conceptually linked. Therefore, in addition to needing to show that the 
positive endorsement of historical materialism disappears in the 80s, one 
would also need to show how and why a set of concepts and practices that 
were once described by Althussser as constituting a Marxist science 
complementary to a reconstructed Marxist philosophy are no longer so 
described. 
 
4.2 The explicit endorsement of scientism in Althusser’s later works 
 As we have seen, due to the lack of positive mentions of Marxist 
science in the published texts from the 80s and owing to certain statements 
where Althusser wrote negatively about his attempts in the early 1960s to 
make Marxist philosophy scientific, a case can be made that Althusser was 
in the process of developing a non- or even anti-scientistic Marxist political 
philosophy. However, if we look at these writings against the background of 
the mid-to late 70s reconstruction of Marxist science and Marxist 
philosophy and if we include the additional context provided by Althusser’s 
writings between 1982 and 1987 that remain unpublished, we will see that 
Althusser never abandoned his scientism and that the endorsement of 
scientific practice appears in these works as a continuous and important part 
of his political philosophy.  
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 In order to make these points, this sub-section will examine selected 
passages from Althusser’s unpublished writings between 1982 and 1987 that 
clearly contradict the theory that he forsook his scientism. Aware that the 
mere statement of Althusser’s continued endorsement of Marxist science 
does not constitute proof that he remained steadfast in his belief that 
science is the only human theoretical practice that allows us to reliably 
understand socioeconomic structures such that we might intentionally assist 
in their transformation, the sub-section that follows this one will turn to a 
reading of published and unpublished writings that illustrates how the 
scientific aspect of Althusser’s late thought relates to its philosophical and 
political aspects. This illustration will challenge our preliminary account of 
how the published materials can be read as evidencing an abandonment of 
Althusser’s advocacy of scientific practice for the worker’s movement . It 
will do so by giving an explanation for the apparent negative references to 
science in these texts.  
 In the archives at IMEC there are multiple texts from the 1980s in 
which Althusser indicates his endorsement of scientific practice and declares 
scientific knowledge’s privileged relationship to political change. These texts 
also detail the relation of scientific practice to Marxist philosophy. Included 
among these texts are unpublished sections of the Interviews with Fernanda 
Navarro as well as two long drafts from 1985 and 1986-87 titled “Qu'y 
faire? Que faire?” and “Thèses de juin.” The latter two are not only 
unambiguous in their endorsement of science and in their assessment of its 
efficacy; they also connect this affirmation to the project of aleatory 
materialism.133 This connection, along with the less clear-cut but still evident 
                                                 
133 The omission of these texts does not appear to reflect an active intent on the part of 
Althusser’s posthumous editors to erase his scientism as it does an attempt on their 
part to emphasize the philosophical content of his work and to downplay the often 
hallucinatory or prophetic aspects of these texts, aspects which become prominent 
when Althusser speaks of current events and their concrete analyses.  
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endorsement of science found in the Navarro interviews, will be explored 
after citing these texts’ explicit scientistic statements. 
 Following the model set by Lenin in 1901, both “Qu'y faire? Que 
faire?” and “Thèses de juin” resemble a slew of unpublished texts from the 
1970s and 1980s in which Althusser reflects on “What Is to Be Done?” in 
order to advance communism’s goals. As the complete text of J'écris ce livre en 
octobre 1982 contains an evaluation of the present conjuncture along with 
specific recommendations for political action, the unfinished book from 
which the essay “The Underground Current of the Materialism of the 
Encounter” is culled also fits this pattern. Consistently, these “stocktaking” 
sorts of pieces are comprised of historical and philosophical reflections, 
socio-economic analyses, and strategic recommendations. These exercises 
also habitually express Althusser’s judgment that historical materialism is a 
science, that it has for its object the class struggle, and that this science must 
be pursued if one wishes to arrive at an effective political strategy. For 
example, in the introductory section of 1985’s “Qu'y faire? Que faire?,” 
Althusser states that a successful long-term political strategy  “can only rest 
on objective…scientific knowledge” of the present “economic, political, and 
ideological conjuncture.” He further stresses that, “in order to achieve this 
knowledge” which is, “in the last resort, the analysis of the relations and 
forms of class struggle in the present conjuncture and its contradictory 
tendencies and its conflicts” we need to have “at our disposal a scientific 
theory, one capable of furnishing the abstract-general concepts” that will 
allow us to understand the whole of the present conjuncture. Without such 
a theory, he maintains, “we remain blind and we fall into political error.”  134   
                                                 
134 Althusser, “Qu’y faire ? Que faire ?,” 2.  
 Cette stratégie ne peut, en bons principes marxistes et léninistes, 
reposer que sur la connaissance objective, c’est-a-dire scientifique (c’est 
l’expression même de Lénine sur l’analyse concrète de la situation 
« concrète » qui est pour Lénine l’essence du marxisme).  
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 Written in the summer and edited a few times during the fall or 
winter of 1986, “Thèses de juin” may be the last philosophical text to which 
Althusser touched a pen. It is certainly his ultimate sustained reflection on 
the relation among philosophy, politics, and science. Even at this late date 
and in a text that is disarmingly prophetic, Althusser’s endorsement of 
scientific knowledge for correct political practice rings clear. In its first 
section, Althusser introduces “Thèses de juin” as a piece intended to 
“provide a couple of observations that might increase the awareness of men 
engaged in the struggle or of those who are waiting for ‘a different 
politics’.”135 He then poses a methodological question about how to proceed 
to this knowledge, asking whether or not one should begin with “the 
concrete analysis of the concrete situation of some country or even of the 
world; or, the examination and correction of the theoretical instruments that 
permit this analysis.” Because he believes that “the second [path] will be 
more difficult but more sure,” Althusser begins the critical section of the 
text with some detailed remarks on Marxist philosophy and Marxist science. 
After finishing this methodological portion, he then proceeds to what he 
labels a markedly “less assured” concrete analysis of the contemporary 
political-economic-ideological situation.136 We will return to the preliminary 
                                                 
 Cette analyse concrète de la conjoncture économique politique et 
l’idéologique, c’est-à-dire en dernier ressort l’analyse des rapports et formes 
des luttes de classes dans la conjoncture actuelle et des tendances 
contradictoires de ces conflits, ne peut s’effectuer que si on dispose d’une 
théorie scientifique …capable de fournir les concepts abstraits-généraux 
d’ensemble de l’évolution, non-évolution ou répression de la situation 
actuelle, de la conjoncture actuelle. Sans ces concepts aucune « analyse 
concrète de la situation concrète » n’est possible. …sans théorie on reste dans 
l’aveuglement et on tombe dans l’erreur politique (cf. 
135 Althusser, “Thèses de juin,” 1. 
Voici néanmoins quelques observations générales qui pourront peut-être aider 
à la prise de conscience des hommes engagés dans la lutte…comme des 
hommes non engagés dans la lutte mais qui attendent une « autre politique ». 
136 Ibid., 2. A charitable reader of this analysis would recognize it as the musings of a 
shut-in who has access to a television and to some newspapers but not to scientific 
materials. An uncharitable reader might label it hallucinatory, paranoid, and overly-
optimistic. 
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methodological remarks on Marxist philosophy and Marxist science below. 
However, it is important to note here that, in the theoretical section of one 
of his last texts, Althusser continues to insist that it is only “historical 
materialism” and its body of “scientific concepts” that “permits a concrete 
analysis of the concrete situation”137  
 
4.3 Aleatory materialism and Marxist science: theory for Marxism  
 As mentioned above, “Qu'y faire? Que faire?” and  “Thèses de juin” 
as well as unpublished sections of the Interviews with Fernanda Navarro are 
doubly remarkable. These texts do not merely endorse Marxist science and 
link its practice directly to political efficacy; all three also contain explicit 
passages detailing the relation among aleatory materialist philosophy, 
scientific practice, and political practice. As supplements and corrections to 
the published materials, these writings make it clear that aleatory materialism 
in the 1980s represents the positive side to the critical project of the mid-to 
late 1970s when Althusser endeavored to purge Marxist philosophy and 
historical materialism of idealist elements. Indeed, Althusser unambiguously 
confirms this reading of the project in an unpublished section of the 
                                                 
Ici, deux voies s’ouvrent devant nous :  
–ou bien l’analyse concrète de la situation concrète de tel pays ou 
même du monde 
-ou bien l’examen et la rectification des instruments théoriques 
permettant cette analyse. 
La première voie serait plus facile mais moins assurée. La seconde voie sera 
plus difficile mais plus sûre. Je choisis donc la deuxième voie.  
137 Ibid. 
 A Marx nous devons des concepts scientifiques irremplaçables, 
comme les concepts de mode de production, de forces productives, de rapport 
de production, de marchandise, d’échange, de consommation, de capital fixe, 
de capital variable, de exploitation économique, de dictature d’Etat, des vues 
sur l’action révolutionnaire des masses, sur l’avenir inéluctable du 
communisme etc. etc. 
 Ce sont là –et je ne cite que les principaux–des concepts scientifiques 
relevant de ce que la tradition marxiste désigne sous le nom de matérialisme 
historique, corpus de concepts permettant une analyse concrète de la situation 
concrète. 
51
Lewis: Althusser’s Scientism and Aleatory Materialism
Published by OxyScholar, 2016
  
52 
Navarro interview where he states that the aleatory materialist conceptions 
of philosophy and of scientific practice represent “precisions” of his earlier 
ideas rather than their rejection.138  In the next few paragraphs, we will 
explain what Althusser meant by precisions and how these refinements 
relate to his earlier work. We will also clear up any lingering misconception 
that Althusser renounced his scientism in his later work. 
 It is easier to understand the precisions made to Althusser’s Marxist 
theory in the 1980s if one takes into account his consistent and overarching 
understanding of Marxism as well as the impetus for these adjustments. 
Fundamentally, Althusser saw Marxism as a political movement whose goal 
is the revolutionary transformation of existing socio-economic practices into 
communist ones. As a philosopher and a committed Marxist, he put much 
effort into working out exactly how theoretical and political practices should 
be related in order to achieve the goals of the Marxist movement.139 This 
focus comes through in most of the published work after 1966 and it is 
pronounced in the “Marxist manuals” authored between 1966 and 1978 and 
of which Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes is a late example. 
Althusser’s consistent effort to relate theory and practice in such a way as to 
attain the goals of the Marxist movement is also unmistakable in the series 
of stock-taking pieces from the 1970s and 1980s mentioned above where he 
goes from philosophical reflections on Marxist philosophy and Marxist 
science to methodological and procedural recommendations for party 
policies and procedures that will best allow it to analyze the contemporary 
“concrete situation” and to politically act successfully in relation to this 
knowledge.  
                                                 
138 Althusser, “Philosophie et marxisme. Entretiens avec Fernanda Navarro,” 47. 
 … je parie que la même méprise va se reproduire avec les précisions 
radicales que j’apporte maintenant, toujours dans la même ligne, à mes thèses 
anciennes. [J]e n’ai jamais changé de ligne théorique et politique, même si 
j’ai rectifié, en les affinant, quelques formules, provisoirement définitive. 
139 Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, 51.  
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 Stated simply, the impetus for most of Althusser’s political 
philosophical output is his consistent belief that correct practice flows from 
correct theory.140 If Marxist practice is not doing well in a specific 
conjuncture and if Marxist practice flows from Marxist theory, then it 
follows from this belief and this judgment that a new theorization of how 
the socioeconomic world works and how to change it is a pressing problem 
for the Marxist movement. Given this basic supposition, one way to make 
sense of Althusser’s career is as a series of reactions to practical (and 
therefore theoretical) crises in the Marxist movement. First there is the crisis 
of Stalinism, then that of Humanism, then that of Eurocommunism. Finally, 
after 1981, there is the problem of the rapid decline of the French 
Communist Party as a political power. During each crisis, Althusser worked 
to develop an alternative understanding of Marxist theory that he believed 
to be materialist and correct. As a body, this theory included positions on 
Marxist philosophy, Marxist science, and Marxist organization. Taking stock 
of the philosophical, political, ideological, economic, and theoretical 
conjuncture at each moment of crisis, Althusser positioned this 
reconstructed theory in contradistinction to a hegemonic or nascent Marxist 
theory that he believed to be incorrect and idealist.  
 If we acknowledge Althusser’s overall understanding of Marxism as 
well as the impetus for his successive interventions into Marxist theory, it is 
clear that the common thread which links the Marxist manuals, balance 
sheets, and many of the published works is that all represent critiques and 
revisions to existing Marxist theory that are written in order to better enable 
Marxist practice to achieve Marxist goals. If we then connect Althusser’s 
consistent belief that correct practice flows from correct theory with these 
ideas about theory and especially with his understanding of philosophy as a 
                                                 
140 Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, 111–112; Althusser and Matheron, The 
Humanist Controversy and Other Writings, 1966-67, 297; Althusser, “Philosophie et 
marxisme. Entretiens avec Fernanda Navarro,” 48. 
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perpetual battle between materialist and idealist tendencies, then we can 
better see what Althusser was up to the with his critique of dialectical 
materialism and his reconstruction of historical materialism in the late 
1970s.141 More directly and for the purposes of this section of the paper, we 
can also better understand Althusser’s development of a new Marxist 
philosophy, aleatory materialism in the 1980s. In this light, the “texts of the 
crisis,” “Marx in his Limits” and “Marxism Today,” can be recognized as 
attempts to weed out those elements in Marx’s or Marxism’s philosophy 
that are idealist and to distinguish these elements from the materialist ones. 
Similarly illuminated by these connections, “The Underground Current of 
the Materialism of the Encounter,” and “Philosophy and Marxism” can be 
seen as attempts to reconstruct a Marxist philosophy without or with less 
idealist elements and for the then-present conjuncture.142 As we have shown 
above, this “new” or unearthed materialist philosophy does not include a 
rejection of Marxist science. Instead, it is specifically proposed as a 
philosophy for a Marxist theory that, at its inauguration, lacked a philosophy 
and “was basically scientific in nature”143 It was also meant to critique and 
replace that other “Marxist philosophy,” dialectical materialism, which had 
filled in the gaps in Marx’s theory with idealist concepts and whose adoption 
and development had lead to such unfortunate results for the Marxist 
movement.144 Finally, it was meant as a philosophy for the Marxist 
movement during a time in which the communist political movement was in 
                                                 
141 Althusser, “Lenin and Philosphy (February 1968),” 18; Althusser, Philosophy and 
the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other Essays, 1161986191919; 
Althusser, “Du Matérialisme Aléatoire (1986),” 184. 
142 Quote from “The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter,” 
about how this is written so he can say something about Marx. 
143  Althusser, “Philosophy and Marxism: Interviews with Fernanda Navarro (1984-
87),” 257. 
144 Ibid., 254. 
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decline in France and in Europe but where smaller communist movements 
showed promise in other areas.145 
 
4.4 The relation between aleatory materialism and Marxist science 
 This section of the paper will not argue that the materialism of the 
encounter meets the goal that Althusser set for it of being a philosophy that 
can successfully battle the idealist notions of dialectical materialism and 
replace them with a set of theses about the world and its relations that, if 
adopted, might better allow for the success of the global Marxist movement. 
Like Bourdin, Sotiris, Suchting, and Tosel, we think that aleatory 
materialism contains some interesting ideas and that it is worth exploring 
and developing.146 However, we also agree with these and other 
commentators that much of this work is sloppy and often delirious, that it is 
rife with paradoxes and contradictory claims, and that the misreadings of 
the philosophers it brings in to support its ideas detract from its virtues.147 
This sub-section of the paper will also not try to correct these faults, to 
explain these shortcomings, or to give an account of aleatory materialism’s 
contents. Instead, it will merely try to suggest what Althusser meant when 
he argued in his later writings that Marxism is a science and to show how 
this science relates to the philosophy of aleatory materialism. Its thesis is 
this: aleatory materialism is the philosophical part of a body of Marxist 
                                                 
145 Althusser, “Qu’y faire ? Que faire ?,” 22. 
Quoi donc nous attend ? Eh bien comme les petits dieux d’Epicure dans les 
« interstices » des sociétés antiques, ce qui nous attend ce sont des 
« interstices de communisme » dans les pores de nôtres propre société 
capitaliste- impérialiste- interimpérialiste mondiale.  
146 Bourdin, “The Uncertain Materialism of Louis Althusser”; Sotiris, “Philosophy of 
the Encounter”; Suchting, “Althusser’s Late Thinking about Materialism”; Tosel, 
“Les Aléas Du Matérialisme Aléatoire Dans La Dernière Philosophie de Louis 
Althusser.” 
147 Bourdin, “Ce que fait la rencontre aléatoire au matérialisme (et à la philosophie),” 
59; Tosel, “The Hazards of Aleatory Materialism in the Late Philosophy of Louis 
Althusser”; Sotiris, “Contradictions of Aleatory Materialism.” 
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theory that also includes ideological, philosophical, political, and scientific 
components. As the philosophical component of Marxist theory it is not 
meant to replace Marxist science but to complement it. It complements this 
movement as a whole by seeking to remove from Marxist philosophy the 
idealist notions that prevent the Marxist movement from having access to 
scientific knowledge about the world and to replace them with concepts that 
facilitate the gathering of such knowledge. Althusser’s hope was that this 
knowledge could allow the Marxist movement to overcome ideological 
notions about what is to be done and to develop a correct political line, a 
line which allows for the world’s and that movement’s own practical 
transformation. 
 As we have seen, the relationship between the Marxist philosophy of 
aleatory materialism and the Marxist science of historical materialism is 
obscured by the editorial choices made during the publication of Althusser’s 
posthumous works. Despite not being especially visible in the published 
work, the nature of the relationship between the materialism of the 
encounter and Marxist science was nevertheless clear to at least one 
attentive reader, Jean-Claude Bourdin. In a 2012 book chapter titled “Ce 
que fait la rencontre aléatoire au matérialisme,” Bourdin notices that 
Althusser describes aleatory materialism as an "assiette," as a serving plate 
on which correct  (i.e. politically efficacious) ideas about philosophy, science 
and politics can be constructed.148 In this understanding, aleatory 
materialism is not presented primarily as the launching of new political 
ontology, one which establishes the ever-present possibility of an aleatory 
reconfiguration of politics. Instead, aleatory materialism is recognized by 
                                                 
148 Bourdin, “Ce que fait la rencontre aléatoire au matérialisme (et à la philosophie),” 
63. 
…on dira qu’une « assiette » représente un ensemble de catégories les plus 
générales, indépendantes de l’expérience de toute preuve expérimentale, qui 
énonce des propositions sur la structure et le devenir du monde (ou de la 
nature) et sur la forme que doit prendre la pensée pour parvenir à ces énoncés. 
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Bourdin as “a group of general categories, the most general, which are 
independent of experience and of all experimental proof, and which state 
some proposition on the structure and the becoming of the world (or of 
nature) and on the form that thought must take to arrive at these 
statements.”149 Just as we have argued above, Bourdin contends that this set 
of categories is meant to replace the dialectical materialist assumptions that 
have failed both Marxist science and Marxist politics. As such, these 
categories are offered as a basic set of propositions about the world that 
might enable the Marxist movement to understand the historical 
conjuncture such that it can direct its transformation.150 These propositions 
are not meant to directly replace scientific concepts (though they may end 
up suggesting that certain “scientific concepts” are not scientific). Instead, 
they are offered as general categories upon which scientific investigations 
may be based, ones that will allow the Marxist movement to understand 
new conjunctures and unexpected conditions.151 
 Bourdin builds up his case for this understanding of aleatory 
materialism in a compelling manner: first by showing how the ontological 
and voluntarist readings of the materialism of the encounter are problematic 
and then by linking Althusser’s description of aleatory materialism as an 
“assiette” to his insistence that aleatory materialism is a materialist 
philosophy for Marxism and not a materialist philosophy or ontology.152 
However compelling, this reading has the disadvantage of being mostly 
speculative and of departing from a few suggestions dropped by Althusser 
in the published texts. Fortunately, the texts that corroborate this assertion 
were written and they exist in Althusser’s archive. As we have noted above, 
“Qu'y faire? Que faire?” and  “Thèses de juin” as well as sections of the 
                                                 
149 Ibid., 65. 
150 Ibid., 54–55. 
151 Ibid., 82. 
152 Ibid., 70–71. 
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Interviews with Fernanda Navarro include specific endorsements of Marxist 
science and of historical materialism. In addition, in more or less lucid 
fashion, each provides confirmation of Bourdin’s assertion that aleatory 
materialism is intended as an instrumentalist ontology that can ground 
Marxist science and thereby ground Marxist practice in the particular 
historical conjuncture that was the early 1980s. This Marxist philosophy can 
be said to be “true” or more correct than dialectical materialism insofar as 
its ideas about the political world in its constitution and disintegration 
inform and allow Marxist science to proceed in such a way that Marxist 
strategy can be successful.  
 I will start with “Qu'y faire? Que faire?” as an example of a text 
which corroborates Bourdin’s assertion that aleatory materialism is a 
materialist philosophy for Marxism, one that enables the Marxist movement 
to understand the historical conjuncture such that it might direct its 
transformation. After beginning this strategic piece with an impassioned call 
for a historical materialist analysis of the contemporary situation, Althusser 
then proceeds to bemoan the fact that “no one in the world is capable of 
providing the least ‘concrete analysis’ of the conjuncture” or “of conceiving 
any strategy.”153 He attributes this incapacity to the  
general abandonment of Marxist theory, the only [theory] in 
history which has given itself the means for the analysis of a 
economico-politico-ideological conjuncture and its aleatory 
becoming. There exists no comprehensive theory of the world 
capable of trying to think the actual conjuncture and not only 
the long-term tendencies but even the medium and short term 
‘evolution’ or regression of this conjuncture.154 
                                                 
153 Althusser, “Qu’y faire ? Que faire ?,” 13. 
Et comme personne au monde n’est en état de fournir la moindre « analyse 
concrète » de la conjoncture, personne au monde, même les tout-puissants 
USA et leurs dirigeant, n’est capable de concevoir la moindre stratégie. 
154 Ibid., 13–14. 
…depuis l’abandon généralisé de la théorie marxiste, la seule qui se soit 
donné dans l’histoire les moyens de l’analyse d’une conjoncture  économico-
politico- idéologique et de son devenir aléatoire, [???] il n’existe aucune 
théorie d’ensemble au monde capable de tenter de penser la conjoncture 
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In this grievance and in Althusser’s explanation of the situation that led to 
this impasse we see marked out the relation between philosophy, science, 
and political strategy. At its most general, this quote tells us, Marxist theory 
provides or provided us with a “comprehensive theory of the world.” This 
theory renders us “capable of trying to think the actual conjuncture” and its 
tendencies and it permits a historical materialist analysis of the present 
economico-politico-ideological situation and the possibilities for this 
situation’s transformation.  
 In a more confrontational tone, the relationship within Marxist 
theory between philosophy and science is also concisely described in 
“Thèses de juin” and “Philosophy and Marxism.” In the interview, 
Althusser concludes a response to a question about his antihumanism and 
the reasons for this position with the statement “we at last understand why 
it is indispensable to know, and know scientifically what the ideological class 
struggle is in order to at last understand what ideology is. And if one has 
followed me, one will also have understood in what manner materialist 
philosophy is indispensable for understanding the ideological struggle.”155 In 
this summary statement Althusser signals that Marxist philosophy is a 
comprehensive theory of the world, a theory that is not identical to scientific 
knowledge. Short of being identical to it, this philosophy is that part of 
Marxist theory that provides the conceptual categories that allow us to 
pursue scientific studies.  
                                                 
actuelle et la (ou les) tendances non pas à long termes mais même à moyen et 
court terme d’«évolution » ou de régression de cette conjoncture 
155 Althusser, “Philosophie et marxisme. Entretiens avec Fernanda Navarro,” 48. 
Je m’arrête, – mais pour réponde à la question posée, on comprend enfin 
pourquoi il est indispensable de bien savoir, et d’un savoir scientifique ce 
qu’est la lutte de classe idéologique, pour enfin comprendre ce qu’est 
l’idéologie. Et on m’a bien suivi, on aura aussi compris en quoi la philosophie 
matérialiste est indispensable pour comprendre la lutte idéologique 
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 What is this “center for theoretical thought and therefore the 
possibility of explaining the conjuncture and its evolutionary tendencies?”156 
Well, after asking a similar question in “Thèses de juin” about “what 
theoretical instruments are at our disposition for the analysis of a concrete 
historical situation, either in one country or in the world,” Althusser first 
entertains the idea that the “bourgeois theory of society” can provide such a 
center. He rejects this possibility, however, because “the weakness of these 
theoretical elements is their being rooted in a bad philosophy, whether it be  
subjectivist-idealist, positivist, or structuralist…”157 With Marx though, 
Althusser opines, “we owe irreplaceable scientific concepts…falling within 
what the Marxist tradition designates under the name historical materialism, a 
corpus of concepts permitting a concrete analysis of the concrete 
situation.158 Does this mean that historical materialism is this center, the 
“assiette,” on which correct ideas can be constructed? No, on the contrary 
and despite the recognition of historical materialism’s necessity and power, 
Althusser does not recommend historical materialist concepts as the center 
for theoretical thought. Instead, he explains that these “scientific concepts 
are only valuable on the foundation of a correct philosophy and that…we can 
only make use of them under the correct orientation that this correct 
                                                 
156 Althusser, “Qu’y faire ? Que faire ?,” 14. 
Nous nous trouvons donc exactement dans la situation que Machiavel décrit à 
propos de l’Italie : les moyennes humaines et matériels sont là des hommes 
capables à l’infini innombrables intelligents et vivants, n’attendant qu’une 
stratégie pour s’y engager, mais il leur manque un centre de pensée théorique 
donc de possibilité d’explication de la conjoncture et de ses tendances 
évolutives 
157 Althusser, “Thèses de juin,” 2. 
Il y a beaucoup de concepts intéressants à emprunter à la théorie bourgeoise 
de la société. On pourra les examiner en une autre occasion. La faiblesse de 
ces éléments théoriques est leur enracinement dans une mauvaise philosophie, 
soit subjectivistes- idéalistes, soit positivistes, soit structuralistes 
158 Ibid. 
A Marx nous devons des concepts scientifiques irremplaçables… Ce sont là –
et je ne cite que les principaux–des concepts scientifiques relevant de ce que la 
tradition marxiste désigne sous le nom de matérialisme historique, corpus de 
concepts permettant une analyse concrète de la situation concrète 
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philosophy confers.159 What is this philosophy? A few paragraphs later, 
Althusser writes, “the true materialism that is suitable to Marxism is aleatory 
materialism.”160 
  
4.5  Making sense of the anti-scientistic statements  
 If by this survey of Althusser’s published and unpublished texts from 
the 1980s we have demonstrated that Althusser did not abandon his 
scientism and that this belief appears in his later work as a continuous and 
important part of his philosophy then we have yet to account for the 
seemingly anti-scientistic statements in the published work on the 
materialism of the encounter. Based on what we have established though, 
this accounting should not be hard to do. We can now take it as established 
that Althusser never abandoned Marxist science but that he did engage in its 
reconstruction in the 1970s. Further, we know that this reconstruction was 
directly related to a thoroughgoing critique of dialectical materialism and to 
the positive development of a new version of Marxist philosophy, a 
philosophy that eventually came to be called aleatory materialism or the 
materialism of the encounter. In addition, we know that choices made by 
Althusser’s editors resulted in the expurgation of most of the comments 
where Althusser clearly indicates the necessity of scientific practice for 
political transformation.161 If we acknowledge all this, then we can see 
                                                 
159 Ibid., 2–3. 
…des concepts scientifiques ne sont valables que sur le fond d’une 
philosophie juste et que d’une certaine manière on ne peut les utiliser que sous 
la juste orientation que leur confère cette philosophie juste » 
 
160 Ibid., 4. 
161 In the editorial remarks that accompany the publication of “Of Marxist Thought 
(1982), Haider and Mohandesi notice this absent presence, remarking: 
The vocabulary we have come to associate with Althusser is nowhere to be 
found: science, ideology, problematic, epistemological rupture, materialism, 
and so forth are all terms which are either entirely absent or thoroughly emp-
tied of their former theoretical connotations. But while the language in which 
it is told has certainly changed, the objective of the story seems to be the 
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Althusser’s admission in the letter to Merab Mardashvili that he had in the 
early 1960s “fabricated a little, typically French justification…for 
Marxism's…pretension to being a science”162 as a critique of the justification 
for Marxism's pretension to being a science rather than as a disavowal of the 
belief that “something in Marxism is scientific.” What has changed by the 
late 1970s is not the belief that historical materialism is a science but the 
justification for why Althusser understood it to be so. Whereas formerly 
Althusser had believed there was a rationalist justification for Marxism’s 
pretensions, by 1978 and the writing of the letter to Mardashvili, the 
justification for Marxism’s status as a science had become practical or 
pragmatic in the technical sense of the term.163   
 This change in the justification of Althusser’s belief that an important 
part of Marxist theory is scientific also explains Althusser’s statement from 
the Navarro interview that materialist philosophy “does not claim to be 
autonomous or to ground its own origin and its own power. Nor does it 
consider itself to be a science, and still less the Science of sciences.”164 As we 
have seen, Althusser did not consider materialist philosophy to be 
autonomous because its status as a materialism depends on how it relates to 
other philosophies competing for theoretical space at a particular historical 
conjuncture; its contents are therefore historically contingent. Similarly, it is 
neither itself a science nor can it be the Theoretical Science that polices the 
other sciences. Instead, materialist philosophy in Althusser’s aleatory 
materialist reconstruction is presented as a set of general judgments about 
the world that allow the sciences and particularly the science of historical 
materialism to proceed and to constitute itself. Materialist philosophy is not 
                                                 
same: to discover what must be brought to life from the tortuous history of the 
thought of Marx and Engels.  
See : Haider and Mohandesi, “Underground Currents.” 
162 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 3. 
163 Baltas, “Critical Notice,” 655. 
164 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 274. 
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science nor is materialist science a philosophy of the encounter. Both, 
however, are complementary parts of a larger Marxist theory.165 In a similar 
fashion, the larger context we have provided in our account allows us to 
understand that the editorial advice given by Althusser in a letter to Navarro 
in 1986 to drop the bits about science and ideology from the interview 
cannot possibly be motivated by a denial of the possibility of making a 
distinction between the two types of theory or by an abandonment of 
Marxist science. Instead, we should take Althusser at his word that “[t]hat 
section is not ready yet, and ought to be rewritten.”166  
 Of the seemingly anti-scientistic statements made by Althusser, there 
remains the Navarro interview where Althusser stated that the objects of 
Marxism and psychoanalysis “belong not to accomplished history but to 
Geschichte, to living history, which is made of, and wells up out of, aleatory 
tendencies and the unconscious. This is a history whose forms have nothing 
to do with the determinism of physical laws.”167 Though there is not space 
to go into a full explanation of this statement here, we should note that 
Althusser does not write that there cannot be a science of history, only that 
the objects of history do not act in a deterministic manner, as do physical 
objects. This recognition does not mean that there is no science of history; 
just that history cannot be a science of objects characterized by their 
adherence to certain invariable, deterministic laws. Indeed, as we have 
argued in another paper, to go from the statement that history does not 
work according to the determinism of physical laws to the assertion that 
Althusser rejects a science of history can only be done by ignoring the 
consistent contrast Althusser makes between natural laws and the social 
scientific laws of which historical laws are a subset. One can also only make 
                                                 
165 Althusser, “Philosophy and Marxism: Interviews with Fernanda Navarro (1984-
87),” 22. 
166 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 287. 
167 Ibid., 264. 
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such an assertion if one ignores Althusser’s decades-long campaign against 
dialectical materialism for its insistence that historical laws and physical laws 
are identical in terms of their both being instances of the fundamental 
dialectical law of nature.168 In short, this quote does not so much reveal the 
abandonment of Marxist science as it does the fruits of historical 
materialism’s reconstruction as a non-teleological science that examines 
existing historical tendencies in the complexity of their contingent 
interactions and for the possibility of their adjustment or transformation.   
 
Conclusion 
 Using both published and unpublished texts, this essay has provided 
a diachronic examination of Althusser’s understanding of Marxist theory 
and of the relations among philosophy, science, ideology and political 
change at different periods of his career. It has shown that, even with all the 
changes, precisions, and reconstructions to this theory’s component parts 
and to his thoughts about these parts’ interrelations, Althusser has 
consistently maintained that scientific practice tends to replace existing ideas 
about the social and natural world and to generate new knowledge about 
these interactions which, insofar as it is correct, conduces to these relations’ 
transformation. By demonstrating that the reading of Althusser which finds 
in his conception of the relations between science, philosophy, and politics a 
pronounced continuity as well as pronounced scientism, it has also 
challenged those who insist upon a differentiation between an earlier, 
scientistic Althusser and a later, ontological one. A corollary to this finding 
is that it is now more difficult to forge a connection between Althusser and 
certain contemporary political philosophers who abandon historical 
materialism and the social sciences and who look to ontology in order to 
suggest the possibility of political transformation. In addition, the correction 
                                                 
168 Lewis, “Althusser on Laws Natural and Juridical,” 39. 
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of the misunderstanding that Althusser abandoned his scientism in his later 
works allows us to view this later philosophy in a more charitable light. No 
longer is it necessary to assess aleatory materialism against other, more 
sophisticated, less contradictory, and more fully realized ontologies. Now, 
we can judge the materialism of the encounter as Althusser seems to have 
intended, pragmatically, in terms of how well it works with Marxist  science 
to produce practical knowledge advantageous to our political 
transformation. Finally, if one agrees with Althusser about the relation 
between aleatory materialism and Marxist science, it becomes less easy to 
overestimate the role played by philosophy in understanding and 
encouraging revolutionary transitions. It should also encourage us to return 
to the scientific study of our socio-economico-political conjuncture, its 
tendencies, and of how we can intervene so as to transform these conditions 
and relations.   
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